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PRESCRIPTION FOR FAIRNESS:
A NEW APPROACH TO TORT LIABILITY OF
BRAND-NAME AND GENERIC DRUG
MANUFACTURERS
ALLEN ROSTRON†
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, courts have consistently ruled that the
manufacturer of a brand-name prescription drug cannot be liable for
injuries suffered by those taking generic imitations of its product. This
meant that a patient injured by a generic drug could have no remedy
at all because in many instances the generic drug manufacturer would
escape liability on the ground that it did not produce any information
on which the patient’s doctor relied. It was a perplexing dilemma. The
generic drug manufacturer made the product that the plaintiff
received, the brand-name manufacturer produced all of the
information the patient’s doctor saw, and neither manufacturer could
be held liable even if each acted negligently.
The California Court of Appeal recently issued a stunning decision
in which it concluded that a brand-name drug manufacturer could be
liable to a plaintiff who took a generic version of its product. The
reaction to the decision has been overwhelmingly negative.
Commentators have condemned the decision as one of the worst
rulings made by any court in recent years. Judges around the country
have dismissed it as a misguided aberration from the otherwise strong
judicial consensus on the issue.
Although the decision has been the subject of scathing criticism,
this Article argues that the California court’s ruling actually represents
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the first time that a court has properly examined this issue. In
addition, the Article points out some weaknesses in the California
court’s reasoning and proposes a novel general framework for
analyzing the liability of brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a person goes to see her doctor about a minor
health problem. The doctor writes a prescription for a drug that
should help the patient. The doctor has seen advertisements for the
drug in medical journals, heard about the drug during visits from its
manufacturer’s sales representatives, and read all of the instructions
and warnings provided in the drug’s labeling. Based on this
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information, the doctor has every reason to believe the drug will be
safe and effective, but the drug turns out to have a terrible adverse
effect on the patient. The doctor was unaware of this risk because the
manufacturer did not mention it in the drug’s labeling, advertising, or
other promotional efforts. If the manufacturer had done so, the
doctor would not have written the prescription. The patient suffers
severe, permanent harm from using the drug. Hoping to obtain fair
compensation for her injuries, the patient retains a lawyer who
investigates and finds proof that the drug’s manufacturer should have
known about the risk and was extremely negligent in not providing
warnings about it.
Under these circumstances, the drug’s manufacturer will be
liable for the harm resulting from its negligence. If the story changes
in one small way, however, controversy and doubt will surround the
patient’s case. Imagine that several companies manufacture the drug
in question. One of them invented the drug, first brought it to market,
and still sells it under a unique brand name. When that company’s
patent on the drug expired, other companies began making and
selling generic duplicates. In addition to reproducing the drug itself,
the generic drug manufacturers copied verbatim all the warnings and
other information on the brand-name drug’s labeling. When the
hypothetical patient took her doctor’s prescription to a pharmacy, the
pharmacist gave her one of the generic versions of the drug rather
than the brand-name product.
Assuming again that each of the drug makers should have known
about the risk and that each acted unreasonably in not providing
warnings about it, one might think the plaintiff would still have some
legal remedy for her injuries. The fact that the patient received the
generic drug, however, will drastically complicate her case and may
prevent her from recovering compensation from anyone. If the
patient sues the manufacturer of the brand-name drug, that
manufacturer will insist it cannot be liable because the patient did not
consume its product. If the patient sues the manufacturer of the
generic drug she received, that manufacturer will insist it cannot be
liable because the patient’s doctor did not look at or rely upon the
generic product’s labeling or any other information disseminated by
the generic manufacturer. In other words, one manufacturer supplied
the drug that the patient received but not the information that her
doctor saw; the other manufacturer provided the information but not
the drug. According to the drug companies, this means neither
manufacturer can be held responsible for the patient’s injuries.
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Courts have confronted this sort of situation many times over the
past two decades. Until recently, precedent almost uniformly favored
defendants. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
rendered the seminal decision on the issue in 1994, ruling in Foster v.
1
American Home Products Corp. that a brand-name drug
manufacturer could not be held liable for injuries suffered by a
patient who took the generic equivalent of the manufacturer’s
2
product. Other courts around the country consistently followed the
Fourth Circuit’s lead, rejecting various types of claims asserted
against brand-name manufacturers by plaintiffs who took generic
3
drugs. Although these decisions did not completely rule out the
possibility that the generic drug’s manufacturer could be held liable,
they left plaintiffs with the difficult task of finding a way around the
fact that doctors rarely see or otherwise rely directly upon any
information produced by the generic manufacturer.
The issue seemed settled until the California Court of Appeal’s
4
startling 2008 decision in Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. Rejecting the
reasoning of Foster and the long line of cases that followed it, the
California court held that a brand-name manufacturer could be liable
when the plaintiff took the generic version of the drug but alleged
that her doctor relied on negligent misrepresentations made by the
5
brand-name manufacturer. Despite ruling in the plaintiff’s favor on
the claim against the brand-name drug maker, the court held that the
generic manufacturer could not be held liable because the plaintiff’s
6
doctor did not rely upon any information from that company. The
Conte opinion thus reached the seemingly odd conclusion that the
only manufacturer that could be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries was
one that did not make the drug that the plaintiff received.
Virtually all of the reaction to the Conte decision has been
intensely negative. Commentators have mercilessly lambasted the
California court for concluding that a drug manufacturer could be
liable for injuries suffered by someone who took another company’s
7
product. Lawyers who represent drug companies put Conte at the
1. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 171–72. For a more detailed account of the case, see infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008). For a more detailed account
of the case, see infra Part II.C.
5. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307–18.
6. Id. at 318–20.
7. See infra Part II.D.
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head of the list of “worst drug and medical device product liability
8
decisions of the year,” and tort reform advocates condemned it as
9
“bad law, bad public policy and a national embarrassment.”
Likewise, other courts, now facing a split of authority on the issue,
have been nearly unanimous in condemning Conte’s reasoning, siding
with the older precedent of Foster and its progeny, and rejecting any
attempts to hold brand-name drug manufacturers liable for generic
10
drug injuries.
The issue has seized the attention of lawyers who represent
plaintiffs and those who represent defendants in prescription drug
litigation. Moreover, the ways in which courts think about and resolve
the issue could have profound implications that extend well beyond
the pharmaceutical context to cases involving other sorts of products.
Despite its intricacy and importance, the issue has received very little
11
scholarly attention to date.
This Article argues that plaintiffs who took generic drugs should
be able to hold brand-name drug manufacturers liable in some
circumstances. Although courts and commentators have
overwhelmingly sided with the drug manufacturers, treating the
Conte decision as a lonely and misguided deviation from past
precedents and sound principles of products liability law, I contend
that Conte should instead be seen as the first case in which a court
finally got this issue right. The Conte court saw through distracting
mischaracterizations of the issue that plagued judicial analysis in

8. James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Top Ten Best and Worst Prescription Drug/Medical
Device Decisions of 2008—The Worst, DRUG & DEVICE L. (Dec. 23, 2008, 8:00 AM), http://
druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/12/top-ten-best-and-worst-prescription.html.
9. Lawrence J. McQuillan & K. Lloyd Billingsley, Opinion: Don’t Hold Drugmakers
Liable for Competitors’ Generics, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2009, at 13A.
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. The discussion in law journals by legal academics and students has been limited. See
Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor’s Copycat
Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 673 (2010) (criticizing the Conte decision); Jean A.
Brodie, Casenote, Foster v. American Home Products Corp.: Tort Liability for Injuries Caused
by Someone Else’s Product?, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 431 (1995) (arguing that the Foster case
was rightly decided); Beatrice Skye Resendes, Note, The Extinct Distinction of Privity: When a
Generic Drug Label Fails to Warn, the Drug’s Pioneer Should Be Liable as Component Part
Supplier of the Warning Label, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 95 (2009) (arguing that brand-name
drug makers should be subject to strict liability on the ground that a generic drug’s warning
label is essentially a component supplied by the brand-name product’s manufacturer). Lawyers
who represent drug companies have also argued that Conte was wrongly decided. See Bridget
M. Ahmann & Erin M. Verneris, Name Brand Exposure for Generic Drug Use: Prescription for
Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 767 (2009).
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Foster and other past cases. Applying basic rules of liability for
negligence, the court correctly recognized that a manufacturer may be
liable in some instances for tortious conduct other than having made
or sold the product that inflicted plaintiff’s injuries. Although all
questions about liability for prescription drugs should be handled
with special care because of the unique difficulty of developing new
drugs and their immense potential benefits for consumers, the Conte
court soundly concluded that fairness and policy considerations
ultimately weigh against giving brand-name manufacturers complete
immunity from liability for generic drug injuries.
At the same time, the Conte court erred in concluding that only
the brand-name drug maker, and not the manufacturer of the generic
drug that the plaintiff received, could be liable. The court allowed the
generic manufacturer to escape liability on the ground that it did not
supply any of the information the plaintiff’s doctor considered in
deciding to prescribe the drug. Given that doctors seldom see generic
drug labeling or other information disseminated by generic
manufacturers, this approach essentially amounts to absolving generic
manufacturers of all liability for inadequate warnings or
misrepresentations about their products. This creates far too much of
an imbalance between the potential liability of the brand-name
manufacturer and its generic counterparts, with the former bearing a
disproportionate share of the burden of liability when brand-name
and generic manufacturers alike provided inadequate or inaccurate
information about the drug.
Drawing on these critical assessments of Conte and previous
court decisions, this Article proposes a new general framework for
drug manufacturer liability. The proposed scheme recognizes that in
some instances a plaintiff can assert viable claims against both the
brand-name and generic drug producers. For example, when the
brand-name manufacturer caused the plaintiff’s injuries by
negligently designing the product or failing to give adequate warnings
about its dangers, but the plaintiff took a generic version of the drug,
sufficient grounds exist for imposing liability on both the brand-name
and generic manufacturers. At the same time, the framework outlined
here accepts the possibility of imposing liability on multiple
manufacturers but strives to achieve a fair distribution of the
responsibility among the manufacturers. The generic manufacturer in
the above example profited from selling the product taken by the
plaintiff, and its connection to the plaintiff’s injuries is even stronger
and more direct than that of the brand-name manufacturer. As a
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result, the generic manufacturer should bear primary liability for the
plaintiff’s injuries, with the brand-name manufacturer having only
secondary liability in the event that the generic drug maker has gone
out of business or is otherwise unable to pay the damages. With its
pivotal distinction between primarily and secondarily liable
tortfeasors, this framework can be applied in other complex torts
scenarios and therefore has implications far beyond the context of
prescription drug liability.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the federal
regulatory scheme governing brand-name and generic drugs. It
focuses on the regulations concerning changes to drug labeling
because the ability of brand-name and generic manufacturers to
change their product’s labeling is a crucial part of the debate over
what liability they should face under tort law. Part I also provides a
basic look at the various types of claims that can be asserted in
products liability cases. Part II then examines the court decisions
regarding liability of brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. It
follows the history from the Fourth Circuit’s highly influential ruling
in the Foster case and the long line of cases in which other courts
embraced Foster’s reasoning to the California Court of Appeal’s bold
decision in Conte to defy that precedent. Part III delves into the
complex array of arguments made in these cases by plaintiffs and
defendants. Which of the arguments should prevail is a close and
difficult question, whether viewed in terms of tort law principles or
policy, but the analysis ultimately tips toward plaintiffs. Part III
therefore concludes that a brand-name drug manufacturer should be
held liable when it negligently causes harm to plaintiffs taking the
generic equivalent of its product. Finally, Part IV lays out in more
detail a proposed approach to imposing liability on brand-name and
generic drug manufacturers.
I. BACKGROUND
The issues raised by cases like Foster and Conte lie at the
intersection of two intricate and often controversial bodies of law.
This Part begins with an overview of the first of those areas, the
federal regulatory scheme governing prescription drugs, and focuses
in particular on how federal law enables generic and brand-name
manufacturers to exercise control over a drug’s labeling. It then
introduces the basic principles of state tort law that govern products
liability claims.
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A. Brand-Name and Generic Drugs
Federal law requires pharmaceutical companies to obtain
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before
12
distributing any new drugs. A manufacturer submitting a new drug
application to the FDA must provide extensive test data and other
13
information to show that the drug is both safe and effective. The
manufacturer also must provide the labeling it proposes to use for the
drug, including the instructions and warnings about the drug’s
14
potential dangers.
The FDA approval process is expensive, time consuming, and
15
unpredictable.
A manufacturer faces an average wait of
approximately eight and one-half years between the time it
synthesizes a new drug and the point when the FDA approves the
16
drug for sale. Developing a new drug and obtaining FDA approval

12. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). Federal law technically applies only to drugs “introduce[d] or
deliver[ed] for introduction into interstate commerce,” id., but the FDA’s jurisdiction has been
interpreted broadly so that it essentially covers all business that drug companies conduct in the
United States, see, e.g., FDA, COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE § 100.200 (2009), http://www.fda.gov
/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073820.htm (asserting that
the FDA has jurisdiction over any pharmaceutical product containing an ingredient that was
shipped in interstate commerce).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
14. Id. § 355(b)(1)(F). Detailed specifications for a drug’s labeling can be found at 21
C.F.R. § 201.80 (2010).
15. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different,
111 YALE L.J. 151, 164–66 (2001) (describing the FDA drug approval process—which requires
animal testing and three phases of human clinical testing, during each of which the FDA can
request further testing or studies).
16. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug
Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004)
(estimating that research, development, testing, and FDA review of a new drug takes a
minimum of three years, an average of eight and one-half years, and sometimes as long as
twenty years).
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17

for it can cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Most drugs never
18
receive FDA approval.
The financial rewards for obtaining FDA approval of a new drug
can be substantial. The drug’s developer typically obtains a patent
that gives it the exclusive right to make and sell the drug for a limited
time. Though a patent is generally effective for twenty years after
19
filing of the patent application, much of that time could be
consumed by the process of obtaining FDA approval to begin selling
20
the drug. A special provision in federal law therefore permits drug
21
companies to seek up to a five-year extension of a patent’s lifespan.
Drug companies have a number of other tactics for attempting to
22
stretch the duration of their patents, but the manufacturer’s
monopoly over any drug eventually will come to an end. For any
profitable drug, a host of other pharmaceutical companies will be
waiting to pounce and begin selling generic versions when patent
23
protection expires.

17. The average cost of developing a new drug is often estimated to be over $800 million.
E.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV.
503, 510–11 (2009). Skeptics contend that the $800 million figure is a gross exaggeration, but
concede that the average cost of developing a new drug is at least $100 million. See, e.g.,
MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 37–41 (2004) (estimating that the cost of research and development
before taxes was approximately $265 million per drug in 2000 and $455 million per drug in
2001); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW
DRUGS 236–46 (2004) (noting that studies by the Public Citizen and Global Alliance estimated
that the cost of developing a new drug is between $115 million and $240 million).
18. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 15, at 163 n.46 (“An estimated three-fourths of all
drugs for which drug manufacturers seek marketing approval fail to reach the market due
largely to concerns regarding safety and efficacy, as well as undercapitalization of
manufacturers.”).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
20. Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984:
Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 52 (2003).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A).
22. See Melody Wirz, Are Patents Really Limited to 20 Years?—A Closer Look at
Pharmaceuticals, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 3–7 (2003), http://www.okjolt.com/images/pdf/
2003okjoltrev5.pdf (describing four ways that brand-name drug manufacturers effectively
extend the life of their patents: using legislative loopholes and lobbying, initiating litigation
alleging patent infringement, layering patents and combining drugs to create new patents, and
advertising and developing brand names to increase barriers to generic entry).
23. A generic manufacturer that successfully challenges the validity of the brand-name
manufacturer’s patent, rather than waiting for the patent to expire, may be rewarded with a 180day exclusivity period during which no one else can sell a generic version of the product. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006) (allowing the first generic applicant to file an abbreviated new
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Generic drug makers are not required to go through the same
arduous application process as the drug’s original manufacturer. They
can instead submit “[a]bbreviated new drug applications” to the
24
FDA, a shortcut that saves time and money because it does not
require any independent proof that the drug is safe or effective. In
essence, the manufacturer seeking to begin selling a generic drug
must show that its product will be a mere replica of the brand-name
or “listed” drug already approved by the FDA. The generic drug
maker must certify that the generic product will have the same active
ingredient or ingredients as the listed drug; that its route of
administration and strength will be the same as the listed drug; and
that its instructions, warnings, and other labeling also will be identical
25
to those of the listed drug. Moreover, the generic and brand-name
26
drugs must be “bioequivalent,” meaning that the two drugs would
27
have essentially the same effect on a person taking them. This
shortcut to FDA approval benefits consumers by speeding generic
drugs to the market as soon as patent protection of the listed brand28
name drug expires.
Many doctors continue to prescribe a drug by its familiar brand
name even after generic versions of the drug have become available.
State laws give pharmacists the option to fill such prescriptions with
the cheaper generic equivalent unless the doctor prohibited the
pharmacist from doing so by including a specific notation such as “do
29
not substitute” or “dispense as written” on the prescription.

drug application (ANDA) to sell its drug without competition from later ANDA applicants for
180 days).
24. Id. § 355(j).
25. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A). The regulations contain some narrow exceptions to these
requirements, such as provisions under which differences between the generic drug and the
listed drug can be specially approved by the FDA. Id. § 355(j)(2)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 314.93 (2010).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
27. Id. § 355(j)(8)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (defining “[b]ioequivalence” as “the absence of
a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions”).
28. If generic drug makers file ANDAs before the listed drug’s patent protection expires,
the FDA’s approval to start marketing the generic drugs becomes effective as soon as the patent
expires. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III), (j)(5)(B)(ii).
29. See Thomas P. Christensen, Duane M. Kirking, Frank J. Ascione, Lynda S. Welage &
Caroline A. Gaither, Drug Product Selection: Legal Issues, 41 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N 868, 869
(2001) (noting that all states now have drug product-selection laws). For examples of typical
state laws, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4073 (West 2007); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6810(6)
(McKinney 2003); and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 562.008 (West 2001).
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Brand-name drug manufacturers spend billions of dollars every
30
In addition to running
year to promote their products.
advertisements and sending sales representatives to visit doctors,
manufacturers pay to have information about brand-name drugs
31
included in the Physicians’ Desk Reference, an annual publication
that has become most doctors’ primary source of information about
drugs. The book is distributed to physicians free of charge, and it can
32
be found in virtually every doctor’s office, pharmacy, and clinic. The
entry for each drug in the Physicians’ Desk Reference includes a
33
verbatim reproduction of the product’s FDA-approved labeling.
Manufacturers sometimes continue to promote brand-name
drugs aggressively even after generic versions have entered the
34
market. The brand-name manufacturers’ hope is that doctors’
familiarity with the brand names will continue to give their products
35
an edge over the generic equivalents.
Generic manufacturers, on the other hand, typically do not spend
money to promote their products. Indeed, generic drug
manufacturers’ business model is to keep costs and prices low by
spending nothing on advertising or other marketing, and instead to
rely on the brand-name drug manufacturers’ promotional efforts to
36
generate sales of the product. Though brand-name drug makers
typically pay to have their products included in the Physicians’ Desk
37
Reference, for example, generic drug makers do not.

30. Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 31–32 (2008)
(estimating that drug companies spent $57.5 billion on promotional efforts in the United States
in 2004, almost twice as much as they spent on research and development).
31. PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (64th ed. 2010).
32. Morlino v. Med. Ctr. of Ocean Cnty., 684 A.2d 944, 945 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
33. Brief of Appellant at 5, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008)
(Nos. A116707, A117353), 2007 WL 3032224.
34. See Sarah P. Bryan & Thomas L. Hafemeister, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’
Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 505–06 (2009)
(“Because manufacturers of generic drugs spend significantly less on marketing than their
brand-name counterparts, doctors are probably ‘less likely to think of generic alternatives’ when
writing prescriptions.” (quoting Benjamin P. Falit, Curbing Industry Sponsors’ Incentive to
Design Post-Approval Trials that Are Suboptimal for Informing Prescribers but More Likely
than Optimal Designs to Yield Favorable Results, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 969, 1001 (2007))).
35. Id.
36. See Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1500–03 (2008) (describing how generic
manufacturers free ride on brand-name manufacturers’ extensive promotional efforts).
37. Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 5.
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Generic drug manufacturers thus have the chance to earn
substantial profits by riding on the coattails of brand-name
manufacturers’ efforts. With no new research or testing to be done, a
generic manufacturer typically incurs relatively low costs in obtaining
FDA approval to begin marketing a generic version of an existing
38
drug. The generic drug makers’ share of the overall prescription
drug market has been steadily rising, with pharmacists now turning to
39
generic products to fill about two out of three prescriptions.
Prescription drugs continue to be a booming business for brandname as well as generic manufacturers. Total revenue from sales in
the United States reached $234.1 billion in 2008, up from just $40.3
40
billion in 1990 and $120.6 billion in 2000. Although drug companies’
financial fortunes have slipped from the heights they reached a few
years ago, when pharmaceutical manufacturing consistently topped
41
lists of the nation’s most profitable industries, drug makers still
enjoy a spot near the top of the most recent rankings with a robust
19.3 percent return on revenues and a 23 percent profit for
42
shareholders.
Drug makers, whether on the brand-name or generic sides of the
business, believe claims brought against them under state tort law
43
should be preempted by the federal laws that regulate drugs, but
those arguments have not been faring well in courts. In its 2009 ruling
44
in Wyeth v. Levine, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a crushing blow to
the argument that the FDA’s approval of a drug and its labeling
shields the manufacturer from state-law tort liability for failing to

38. Roin, supra note 17, at 510–11 (reporting estimates that the average cost of introducing
a generic drug is only $2 million, compared to over $800 million for an original brand-name
drug).
39. Micah Hartman, Anne Martin, Patricia McDonnell, Aaron Catlin & Nat’l Health
Expenditure Accounts Team, National Health Spending in 2007: Slower Drug Spending
Contributes to Lowest Rate of Overall Growth Since 1998, 28 HEALTH AFF. 246, 250 (2009).
40. Micah Hartman, Anne Martin, Olivia Nuccio, Aaron Catlin & Nat’l Health
Expenditure Accounts Team, Health Spending Growth at a Historic Low in 2008, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 147, 148 exhibit 1 (2010).
41. GOOZNER, supra note 17, at 233.
42. Top Industries: Most Profitable, FORTUNE (May 4, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/industries/profits.
43. For more detailed discussions of the drug industry’s federal preemption arguments, see
Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1095 (2007); Christina Marie Martin, Note, Hugs and Drugs: Research Ethics,
Conflict of Interest, and Why the FDA’s Attempt to Preempt Pharma Failure-to-Warn Claims Is a
Dangerous Prescription, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 587, 593 (2008).
44. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
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45

provide adequate warnings. That case involved a brand-name drug,
so generic manufacturers maintained some hope that they could
distinguish it by emphasizing the unique restraints that federal law
imposes on them, such as the requirement that a generic drug have
46
the same labeling as the brand-name product. Federal district courts
47
split over the issue, federal appellate courts ruled against the generic
manufacturers’ preemption arguments, and the Supreme Court
48
recently agreed to decide the issue. Without a federal preemption
defense, the proper scope of tort liability will continue to be a major
issue for generic and brand-name drug makers alike. And if the
Supreme Court should find that federal law preempts claims against
generic drug manufacturers, the question of whether brand-name
drug makers can be liable to those who took generic drugs will take
on greater significance than ever before.
B. Labeling Requirements
One specific aspect of the federal regulation of prescription
drugs is particularly relevant to the issue of how tort law should apply
to brand-name and generic drug manufacturers: if a drug’s labeling is
dangerously inadequate or misleading, who can correct that problem?
Despite some debate and disagreement surrounding this question, the
bottom-line answer is that both the brand-name manufacturer and
the generic producers of the drug have the ability and responsibility
to fix flaws in drug labeling.

45. See id. at 1204 (“Wyeth has not persuaded us that failure-to-warn claims like Levine’s
obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling.”).
46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
47. See Kim M. Schmid & Shane V. Bohnen, Generic Drugs and Preemption After Wyeth
v. Levine, 22 HEALTH LAW. 35, 36 & n.17 (2009).
48. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because state
imposition of duties to warn on generic drug manufacturers neither renders compliance with
federal regulation impossible nor obstructs the goals of that regulation, we affirm the district
court’s finding that the Demahy’s state-law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted.”), cert.
granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3745, 79 U.S.L.W. 3017, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec.
10, 2010) (No. 09-1501); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605–12 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
decline to assume that Congress intended to shield from tort liability the manufacturers of the
majority of the prescription drugs consumed in this country and leave injured parties like
Mensing no legal remedy.”), cert. granted sub nom. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 3522,
79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-993), and
Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 3523, 79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79
U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1039).
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After it begins to sell a drug, a manufacturer has continuing
49
obligations with respect to the drug’s safety. These include an
obligation to add an additional warning to the label “as soon as there
is reasonable evidence of a causal association” between a drug and a
50
clinically significant hazard. Indeed, pursuant to a regulatory
measure known as the “Changes Being Effected” provision, a
manufacturer can immediately revise a drug’s label, without first
obtaining FDA approval, if the change gives doctors reason to be
51
more cautious about the drug. This includes deleting from the label
any “false, misleading, or unsupported indications” about the drug’s
use or effectiveness, as well as adding or strengthening statements on
the label about “a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse
reaction” or “an instruction about dosage and administration that is
52
intended to increase the safe use of the drug product.”
The FDA has made clear that the obligation to seek labeling
53
changes when safety concerns arise extends to generic drug makers.
When a generic drug manufacturer believes additional or
49. Federal law requires drug manufacturers to submit certain “postmarketing reports” to
the FDA, including prompt reports of any serious and unexpected adverse experience suffered
by a user of the drug, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2010), and annual reports describing any other
significant new information that might affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the product,
id. § 314.81. These reporting requirements are the same for generic drug makers as they are for
brand-name drug producers. Id. § 314.98.
50. Id. § 201.57(c)(6) (subjecting drugs approved by the FDA after June 30, 2001, to the
new rule); see also id. § 201.80(e) (providing the same rule for older drugs approved by the FDA
before June 30, 2001).
51. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii).
52. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)–(D). The FDA also has emphasized that adding text to
the packaging and other materials provided with the drug is not the sole means by which a drug
maker can seek to inform doctors of concerns about the safety of a product. In addition to
warnings provided with the product itself, a manufacturer may opt to send additional
information directly to physicians by issuing “Dear Doctor” letters containing new
precautionary information about a drug. Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content
and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (June 26,
1979); see also Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“The
FDA has made clear that warnings other than labeling changes, such as letters to health care
professionals, are permissible and the labeling regulations do not bar them.”). Such mailings
may be considered part of the drug’s labeling for FDA regulatory purposes. 21 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(l)(2).
53. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr.
28, 1992) (“If an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be added to a
product’s labeling, it should contact FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the
generic and listed drugs should be revised. After approval of an ANDA, if an ANDA holder
believes that new safety information should be added, it should provide adequate supporting
information to FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed
drugs should be revised.”).
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strengthened warnings should be given, or an erroneous or misleading
statement should be corrected, the manufacturer must inform the
FDA so that the FDA can determine whether the labeling for the
54
drug should be revised.
The tricky and controversial question is whether a generic drug
manufacturer can unilaterally add or strengthen its warnings without
prior FDA approval. Although a brand-name manufacturer can add
or strengthen warnings without FDA approval pursuant to the
“Changes Being Effected” regulation, the FDA has taken the
position that generic drug manufacturers do not have the same
55
power. Many courts, however, have suggested that the “Changes
Being Effected” regulation does allow generic manufactures to add or
56
strengthen warnings without prior FDA approval.
Uncertainty thus exists about whether a generic drug
manufacturer can ever unilaterally change a drug’s labeling, but there
is no doubt that a generic drug manufacturer can ask the FDA for
57
permission to add or strengthen the warnings in its labeling. And as
a result, any change to a drug’s labeling will be synchronized, through
FDA coordination, so that the change applies to both brand-name
and generic versions of the drug, regardless of which manufacturer
may have initiated the change. When the brand-name manufacturer
modifies its labeling, the FDA will track the changes and notify
58
generic drug makers that they must revise their labeling as well. And
when the FDA approves a labeling change requested by a generic
manufacturer, the FDA will direct the brand-name manufacturer to
make the same change so that the labeling for all versions of the drug
59
remains consistent. All manufacturers of a drug, including those
producing it in generic form, thus share responsibility for identifying
and eliminating dangers posed by insufficient or inaccurate labeling.

54. Id.
55. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2,848, 2,849 n.1 (Jan. 16, 2008).
56. E.g., Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 439–44 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 78
U.S.L.W. 3745, 79 U.S.L.W. 3017, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No.
09-1501); Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994); Stacel v. Teva
Pharm., USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905–07 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
57. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (providing a mechanism for requesting FDA approval to make
changes to labeling); id. § 314.97 (stating that generic drug manufacturers can seek permission,
pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, to make labeling changes).
58. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,961.
59. Id.

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

1138

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1123

C. Products Liability
Having drawn this basic portrait of the federal regulatory scheme
that governs prescription drugs, a brief sketch of products liability law
is the next element that must be added into the picture. Products
liability is a broad term that describes an entire field of law rather
60
than a single cause of action. It is largely a species of tort law,
although it also has a significant vein of contract law embedded
61
within it because the sale of a product is a contractual relationship.
Products can be dangerous in an endless variety of ways, but four
basic categories of problems dominate the field: manufacturing
defects, design defects, inadequate warnings, and misrepresentations.
Manufacturing defects result from errors made during production,
such as the misplacement of a part by an assembly line worker in a
62
factory. A design defect, on the other hand, renders every unit of the
product dangerous because of some flaw in the blueprints, recipe, or
63
other design specifications originally developed for the product.
Other products liability claims relate to information about the
product, rather than a flaw in the actual product itself. The warnings
and instructions accompanying a product may be insufficient to
64
protect users from the product’s dangers, and a misrepresentation or
false statement about the product also may lead to accidents and
65
injuries.
To complicate matters, a plaintiff may assert each of these four
basic types of products liability claims under any of three different
legal theories—negligence, strict tort liability, and breach of
66
warranty. For example, a plaintiff injured by a product may
simultaneously claim that the product’s manufacturer acted
negligently, assert that the manufacturer is subject to strict tort
liability because the product was in a “defective” and “unreasonably
67
dangerous” condition, and argue that the manufacturer is liable for
60. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.1, at 1, 3 (2d ed. 2008).
61. Professor William Prosser famously and vividly described breach of warranty, a type of
products liability claim, as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.”
William L. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1126 (1960).
62. OWEN, supra note 60, § 7.1, at 446.
63. Id. § 8.1, at 499.
64. Id. § 9.1, at 581.
65. Id. § 3.1, at 113–14.
66. Id. § 1.3, at 29–34.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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breaching an implied warranty that the product would be “fit for the
68
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” Although
negligence is the “classic products liability claim” and continues to
have an important role in products liability law, it has been
overshadowed in recent decades by strict tort liability and breach of
69
warranty. A negligence claim requires proof that the defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care; strict tort liability and breach of
warranty claims do not necessarily require any proof of carelessness
70
or other fault. Strict tort liability and breach of warranty therefore
are two theories under which strict or no-fault liability could be
71
imposed. As a result, these claims are often easier to prove than
negligence claims and may be the most potent weapons for plaintiffs
72
in products liability cases and the most severe threat to defendants.
Although no-fault liability theories have advantages for
plaintiffs, they also come with a variety of important limitations that

68. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1978).
69. OWEN, supra note 60, § 2.1, at 60–61.
70. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963) (describing
how strict liability had been imposed on manufacturers via breach of warranty claims and
concluding that strict liability should be imposed under tort law as well).
71. OWEN, supra note 60, § 5.9, at 329–31 (discussing the distinction between strict liability
and negligence). Intense controversy exists about the extent to which courts truly impose strict
liability in products cases. Many contend that strict liability has been more of an illusion than a
reality, with courts paying lip service to the notion of strict liability even when actually using a
negligence or fault-based approach. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence (to Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593,
643–49 (1980) (“Imposing a negligence standard for design defect liability is in many cases only
to define in a coherent fashion what litigants are in fact arguing and what jurors are in essence
analyzing.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271–73 (1990) (asserting
that, in attempting to reconcile the “rhetoric” of strict liability with “traditional negligence
balancing,” some courts have “create[d] verbal distinctions that have little practical
consequence other than to confuse litigants and commentators”); David G. Owen, Defectiveness
Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 785–86 (“As
courts and commentators have come to recognize the inherent unworkability, illogic, and even
incomprehensibility of such a doctrine in design and warnings cases, the very idea that liability
in these central contexts is ‘strict’ has been viewed increasingly as a myth.”); Ellen Wertheimer,
Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1269–71 (1992) (“Strict products liability has been abolished by judicial
decisions . . . that were faithless to the goals and purposes for which strict products liability was
adopted.”).
72. But see Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability
Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 940 (2002) (suggesting that
strict liability theories may not actually provide an advantage to plaintiffs because juries
respond more favorably to claims phrased in terms of negligence rather than liability without
fault).
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73

do not apply to negligence claims. In particular, both strict tort
liability and warranties claims are special, narrow theories that
pertain only to a limited set of situations. Strict tort liability applies
only to “[o]ne who sells” a product that is defective and unreasonably
74
dangerous. Likewise, liability for breach of warranty can be imposed
75
only on those who sold the product that harmed the plaintiff.
Negligence, on the other hand, is a far more general, universal theory
of liability. It applies to situations within the field of products liability
law that the no-fault theories do not reach, and it also extends far
beyond products liability law to a vast array of other situations in
which injuries occur. Negligence is essentially the all-purpose tool of
tort law, and its scope is much wider than that of more specialized
instruments like strict tort liability or warranties.
Determining how this array of potential grounds for liability
should apply to prescription drugs is perhaps the single most
76
controversial and confusing area within products liability law. Courts
and commentators are virtually unanimous in feeling that “drugs are
different” from other products because they offer extraordinary
potential benefits to humanity while also posing severe potential
dangers, but intense disagreement exists over the implications of
77
those differences. The debate over liability of brand-name and
generic drug manufacturers represents another fierce clash on this
78
already “war-weary terrain.”

73. OWEN, supra note 60, § 2.1, at 60–61.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965); see also id. § 402B (imposing
strict liability on one who makes misrepresentations about a product “sold by him”). The Third
Restatement on Products Liability also addresses only the liability of those who sold the product
in question. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1, 9 (1998)
(providing liability rules for “[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products”).
75. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1978).
76. OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–67 (“Whether and how prescription drugs in
particular should be treated differently from other types of products has consumed more time
and effort, and resulted in the gnashing of more teeth, than about any other particularized issue
in all of products liability law.”).
77. Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 209–10 (1999); see also OWEN,
supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–80 (describing the controversy over design-defect claims concerning
prescription drugs); id. § 9.6, at 627–45 (describing the controversy over inadequate warning
claims concerning prescription drugs).
78. OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 568.
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II. THE CASES
With this background in mind, this Part turns to the specific
problem of injuries suffered by those who take a generic version of a
prescription drug. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Foster v. American
Home Products Corp. and the California Court of Appeal’s decision
79
in Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. dominate the landscape examined here. I
review the factual background of each case in close detail, both
because they are the most significant precedents and also because
these decisions concern real problems that have serious consequences
for plaintiffs and defendants alike. Though it might be easy to lapse
into thinking about the legal issues in more abstract terms, the reality
is that very significant interests, with tangible impacts on many
people’s lives, are at stake on both sides of these cases.
A. Foster v. American Home Products Corp.
Craig and Karen Foster were the parents of infant twins, a girl
80
named Brandy and a boy named Bradley. When the twins were six
81
weeks old, they had a bout of colic, a common condition
82
characterized by irritability, crying, and apparent abdominal pain.
The Fosters took the twins to their pediatrician, who prescribed
83
Phenergan syrup, a brand-name antihistamine and sedative drug
84
used to treat allergies and many other medical conditions. The
pharmacist who filled the prescription substituted promethazine
85
syrup, the generic version of the prescribed drug. The Fosters gave
the generic product to the babies several times over the next few
86
days. On September 11, 1988, the morning after they last gave the
87
drug to the twins, the Fosters found Brandy dead in her crib.
Doctors concluded that Brandy died as a result of Sudden Infant
88
Death Syndrome (SIDS) caused by use of the drug.
79. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
80. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1994).
81. Id.
82. Russell S. Agnes & Richard L. Mones, Infantile Colic: A Review, 4 J. DEVELOPMENTAL
& BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 57, 57 (1983).
83. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167.
84. Phenergan, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/phenergan.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2011).
85. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The Fosters sued the manufacturer of the brand-name drug their
doctor prescribed, as well as the manufacturer of the generic version
they actually received from the pharmacy and gave to their daughter
89
before her death. The Fosters pointed to medical studies showing
90
that the drug posed a significant risk of causing SIDS. The Fosters
alleged that the brand-name manufacturer had been aware of these
studies prior to Brandy’s death but ignored them because stronger
warnings about the drug’s dangers for young children would have
reduced sales of the product and interfered with the company’s hopes
of winning FDA approval to sell the drug as an over-the-counter
91
product. Although the drug’s labeling contained statements advising
that the product was “not recommended for children under 2 years of
92
age” and “should not be used in children under 2 years of age
93
because safety for such use has not been established,” the Fosters
characterized those statements as standard “legalistic” language that
merely indicated the manufacturer had not yet done specific studies
94
to document the drug’s safety for children. The Fosters argued that
these sorts of statements frequently appeared on the labeling of drugs
widely prescribed for young children’s use, and that doctors
interpreted them as meaning that the manufacturer had no reason to
95
think the drug posed any special problems for children. The Fosters
further alleged that the brand-name manufacturer had explicitly

89. Id. After filing their lawsuit, the Fosters learned that they had sued the wrong generic
drug manufacturer. The generic drug taken by their daughter had been manufactured by My-K
Laboratories, not Barre-National Corporation, as the Fosters initially believed. The Fosters’
claims against Barre-National thus were dismissed, and the Fosters filed a new action against
My-K Laboratories. Id.
90. Several articles were written before Brandy Foster’s death. See André Kahn & Denise
Blum, Phenothiazines and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 70 PEDIATRICS 75 (1982) (reporting
the findings of a study concluding that phenothiazine is related to SIDS); André Kahn & Denise
Blum, Possible Role of Phenothiazines in Sudden Infant Death, 314 LANCET 364 (1979)
(presenting evidence of a relationship between the administration of a phenothiazine and sleep
apnea, which could be related to SIDS); André Kahn, Daniele Hasaerts & Denise Blum,
Phenothiazine-Induced Sleep Apneas in Normal Infants, 75 PEDIATRICS 844 (1985) (reporting
the findings of a study concluding that phenothiazine is related to SIDS). Promethazine, the
drug taken by Brandy Foster, is a phenothiazine derivative. Stewart v. Astrue, 551 F. Supp. 2d
1308, 1313 n.7 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
91. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 6–7, Foster, 29 F.3d 165 (No. 93-1627), 1993 WL
13121590.
92. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 35, Foster, 29 F.3d 165 (No. 93-1627), 1993 WL
13121591.
93. Id. at 5, 35.
94. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 17–19, 30.
95. Id.
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misrepresented the drug’s safety for children by claiming in the drug’s
labeling and Physicians’ Desk Reference entry that “[c]hildren
96
tolerate this product well.” The brand-name manufacturer also
promoted Phenergan products with advertisements that featured
illustrations of the Seven Dwarfs from the fairy tale Snow White and
97
touted the drug’s benefits for kids with coughs, colds, and allergies.
One of the key factual questions in the case was what motivated
the Fosters’ pediatrician to prescribe the drug, but the evidence on
that point was muddled. The doctor stated that he had never seen,
and therefore had never relied upon, any information from the drug’s
98
generic manufacturers. The extent to which he relied on labeling,
advertising, or other information generated by the brand-name
manufacturer was much less clear. In a deposition, the doctor testified
that he had been familiar with Phenergan since he received his initial
medical training, and that he had used it many times in treating
99
patients throughout his career as a pediatrician. He said that
Phenergan had been so widely used, for so many years, that he
100
considered it to be “like using Tylenol or things of that nature.” The
doctor further testified that he generally relied on manufacturers to
advise him of a drug’s potential dangers, and that he obtained
information about Phenergan from the manufacturer’s advertising
101
and from reading newsletters and other medical literature. The
doctor added that he would not have prescribed Phenergan for the
Foster children if he had been warned about the studies linking the
102
drug to SIDS. Indeed, after Brandy Foster’s death made him aware
of the drug’s dangers, the doctor stopped prescribing the drug for
103
children less than two years of age.
After his deposition, however, the doctor agreed to sign an
affidavit in support of the brand-name manufacturer’s motion for
104
summary judgment. In the affidavit, the doctor denied that he had

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
motion

Id. at 6, 11–12.
Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 37.
Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 8–9.
Id. at 16; Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 32.
Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 38.
Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 15–16, 19–20.
Id. at 9, 15–17.
Id. at 17–18.
See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (“With its
Wyeth filed an affidavit signed by Dr. Berger stating that he prescribed Phenergan for
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relied on any information from the manufacturer and instead stated
that in prescribing the drug for the Foster children, he had “relied
upon [his] many years of positive experience in using Phenergan to
105
treat patients.” The doctor added that his decision to prescribe the
drug was not influenced by the Physicians’ Desk Reference, and that
he could not remember how long it had been since he had read that
106
book’s entry on the drug. Although he had been visited periodically
by the brand-name manufacturer’s sales representatives, he could not
remember what they talked about with him, and their conversations
107
did not influence his decision to prescribe the drug. Likewise,
although he had seen numerous advertisements for the brand-name
drug over the years, he could not remember much about their
108
contents, and he had not relied on them in prescribing the drug.
The doctor’s affidavit did not directly contradict his deposition
testimony, but it put a very different spin on the situation. The
affidavit focused narrowly on the doctor’s specific thoughts at the
moment he prescribed the drug for the Fosters’ children, whereas the
deposition more broadly addressed the sources of information that,
over time, had shaped the doctor’s perceptions of the drug, its safety,
and its appropriate uses.
The Fosters faced a devilish legal dilemma. Their doctor had
prescribed a brand-name drug, but their pharmacist had given them a
generic substitute made by another company. The doctor affirmed
that he would not have prescribed the drug if he had been adequately
warned about its dangers, and yet the doctor vowed that in
prescribing the drug he had not relied on anything the drug
companies had ever said about their products. One manufacturer was
responsible for promoting the drug and crafting its allegedly
inadequate warnings; another was responsible for actually concocting
the syrup that Brandy received. And in the manufacturers’ view, this
meant neither could be held legally responsible for her death.
The Fosters ultimately were unable to prevail on any of their
claims. Applying Maryland law, the trial judge threw out all but one
of the claims against the brand-name manufacturer, concluding that
Brandy based only on his own experience with the drug and did not rely on any representations
made by Wyeth.”).
105. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 32–33.
106. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 9; Brief of Appellee/CrossAppellant, supra note 92, at 32–33.
107. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 33.
108. Id. at 33, 37–38.
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negligent misrepresentation was the only potentially viable cause of
action against that defendant because the plaintiffs’ other claims were
all products liability theories that could not be asserted against a
company that did not manufacture or sell the drug that Brandy
109
consumed. While discovery was underway, the Fosters voluntarily
agreed to dismiss their suit against the generic drug manufacturer for
110
reasons not revealed by the record, leaving their case focused
entirely on their negligent misrepresentation claim against the brandname drug manufacturer. The trial judge soon tossed that claim as
well, concluding that the Fosters could not prove that their doctor had
relied on any misrepresentations made by the brand-name
111
manufacturer.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, but rather than reach a narrow conclusion that
the Fosters lacked sufficient evidence, the court issued a more
sweeping pronouncement that a brand-name drug maker can never
be liable for harm suffered by a person who takes a generic version of
112
its drug. The court declared that products liability claims can only
be brought against those who manufactured or sold the product that
caused the injury in question, and that plaintiffs cannot circumvent
that limitation by cloaking their case in the guise of a negligent
113
misrepresentation theory. The court emphasized that the Fosters
cited no previous cases in which a manufacturer had been held liable
114
for injuries resulting from use of another manufacturer’s product.
This demonstrated nothing more than the novelty of the issue, for
apparently neither the defendant nor the court had found any past
decisions specifically rejecting claims like those asserted by the
Fosters. The court nevertheless concluded that precedent was on the
defendant’s side, citing irrelevant cases in which products liability
claims failed because plaintiffs had no proof of any connection
115
between the defendant and the plaintiff’s injuries. The Fourth

109. Foster, 29 F.3d at 167. The trial court thus rejected negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty claims. Id.
110. Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 11 n.8. The Fosters apparently did
not sue their doctor. Id.
111. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168.
112. Id. at 168–72.
113. Id. at 168.
114. Id. at 170.
115. The Foster court cited Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and
noted that the case held that Maryland does not recognize nonidentification theories such as
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Circuit’s opinion went on to suggest a litany of other reasons why the
brand-name manufacturer should not be held liable: a brand-name
manufacturer has no relationship with those who take generic
116
versions of its products; a brand-name manufacturer has no control
117
over generic drug makers; and a brand-name manufacturer already
bears the immense cost of developing and promoting new drugs, from
118
which generic competitors then profit by copying.
In a curious bit of dicta, the court suggested that the generic drug
maker, which was no longer a party in the case, could have been held
119
liable for Brandy’s death, but the judges did not explore the
ramifications of this suggestion. The court insisted that a generic drug
company could be held liable for negligent misrepresentation even if
all the statements it ever made about the drug were simply copied
120
from the brand-name drug’s labeling. This observation, however,
overlooked the more difficult issue of whether the generic drug
manufacturer could be held liable even if the plaintiff’s doctor never
looked at the generic drug’s labeling or received any other
information from the generic drug maker. In other words, the Fourth
Circuit judges felt that a generic manufacturer could not escape
liability by pointing out that it did not write its own labeling. It is
unclear what the court felt should happen when the generic
manufacturer also asserts that nobody relied on its labeling.
A decade after the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the FDA
announced that a boxed warning would be added to the drug to bar it

market share liability. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168. The Foster court also cited Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1163–64 (4th Cir. 1986), and noted that the case rejected claims
where the plaintiff could not prove who manufactured the asbestos that allegedly caused his
injuries. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168. The irrelevance of these nonidentification or indeterminate
tortfeasor scenarios is discussed in further detail below. See infra Part III.B. The Foster court
also quoted some broad, general dicta from Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 437 A.2d 242
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), suggesting that every products liability claim requires “attribution of
the defect to the seller” of the product. Foster, 29 F.3d at 168 (quoting Jensen, 437 A.2d at 247).
The Jensen case had nothing to do with issues resembling those in the Foster case, and the dicta
was based on authorities that likewise addressed unrelated issues. See Jensen, 437 A.2d at 247
(citing Edward S. Digges, Jr., Product Liability in Maryland Revisited, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 14
(1977)).
116. Foster, 29 F.3d at 171.
117. Id. at 170.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 169–70.
120. Id.
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from being given to children less than two years of age. A boxed
122
warning, also known as a “black box warning,” is the strongest type
123
of warning that the agency can require. The FDA called for adding
this warning to promethazine after it reviewed reports it had been
receiving since 1969 about children, like Brandy Foster, suffering
respiratory depression and other serious adverse effects from taking
the drug. The reports attributed the deaths of seven infants to the
124
drug.
B. Case Law after Foster
Foster proved to be an immensely valuable precedent for the
drug industry. The Fourth Circuit’s position became the prevailing
view as courts all over the country followed its reasoning in rejecting
claims brought by plaintiffs who tried to sue brand-name drug
125
manufacturers despite having taken generic equivalents. The judges

121. Peter R. Starke, Joyce Weaver & Badrul A. Chowdhury, Boxed Warning Added to
Promethazine Labeling for Pediatric Use, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2653, 2653 (2005).
122. Raymond A. Mullady Jr., Everything You Needed and Wanted to Know About Black
Box Warnings, 68 DEF. COUNSEL J. 50, 51 (2001).
123. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2010) (“Certain contraindications or serious warnings,
particularly those that may lead to death or serious injury, may be required by the FDA to be
presented in a box.”).
124. Starke et al., supra note 121, at 2653.
125. Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2008 WL 2677051, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. June 30,
2008); Pustejovsky v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-103-Y, 2008 WL 1314902, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
3, 2008); Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Barnhill v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 06-0282-CB-M, 2007 WL 5787186, at *1 & n.2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007);
Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:04-CV-1477, 2006 WL 2038436, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006);
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 538–43 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); Possa v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. 05-1307-JJB-SCR, 2006 WL 6393160, at *1 (M.D. La. May 10, 2006); Tarver v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.3-04-2036, 2006 WL 1517546, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Jan. 26, 2006); Tarver v.
Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.3-04-2036, 2005 WL 4052382, at *2–3 (W.D. La. June 7, 2005); Sheeks v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 02CV337, 2004 WL 4056060, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 15, 2004); Doe v.
Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626–30 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Murphy v.
Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Block v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
Civ.A.3:02-CV-1077, 2003 WL 203067, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2003); Beutella v. A.H.
Robins Co., No. 980502372, 2001 WL 35669202, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 10, 2001); Reynolds v.
Anton, No. 01A-76719-3, slip op. at 14 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004), 2004 WL 5000272; Stanley
v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34–35 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Kelly v. Wyeth, No.
Civ.A.MICV200303314B, 2005 WL 4056740, at *2–5 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 6, 2005); Sloan v.
Wyeth, No. MRS-L-1183-04, slip op. at 2–5, 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2004), 2004 WL
5767103; cf. DaCosta v. Novartis AG, No. CV 01-800-BR, 2002 WL 31957424, at *9 (D. Or.
Mar. 1, 2002) (holding that an individual sales representative of a pharmaceutical manufacturer
could not be held liable when he did not promote the particular drug taken by the plaintiff);
Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350–52 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting
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in these cases did not seem to regard the issue as a close one. An
appellate court in Florida, for example, rejected a plaintiff’s claims
against a brand-name drug manufacturer with an opinion consisting
126
of nothing more than a citation of the Foster case.
A few judges challenged the orthodox view, but their rulings
could be brushed aside as minor deviations from the otherwise
unanimous national consensus on the issue. For example, in Easter v.
127
Aventis Pasteur, Inc., a federal judge in Texas held that the original
designer of a pharmaceutical product could be held liable for harm
resulting from a patient’s use of other manufacturers’ versions of the
128
same product. The case concerned a child allegedly exposed to
harmful levels of mercury contained in thimerosal, a preservative
129
used in pediatric vaccines. The child’s mother sued Eli Lilly & Co.,
even though that company had not manufactured the thimerosal in
130
the vaccines received by her child. The mother alleged that “for
many years, Lilly, as the original designer of thimerosal, distorted
published medical literature and deceived health regulators and
131
physicians about the safety of thimerosal,” and that thimerosal had
become a widely used product because doctors, government
regulators, and other manufacturers had relied on Lilly’s
132
misrepresentations. Although Lilly insisted that it could not be held
liable for harm suffered via use of products it played no part in
manufacturing, the court held that Lilly knew other manufacturers
had copied its design, was in the best position to know about the
potential hazards of that design, and thus had a duty to warn about
133
those risks.

misrepresentation claims against a brand-name drug manufacturer on the alternative grounds
that federal law preempted the claims and that the manufacturer could not be liable for injuries
suffered by a patient who consumed a generic version of the drug).
126. Sharp v. Leichus, 952 So. 2d 555, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), aff’g No. 2004-CA0643, 2006 WL 515532 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006).
127. Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No. 5:03-CV-141(TJW), 2004 WL 3104610 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 11, 2004).
128. Id. at *10.
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id. at *2, 8.
131. Id. at *8.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *9.

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

1149

134

A few years later, in Clark v. Pfizer Inc., a Pennsylvania trial
court reached a similar conclusion in a case that involved only
135
economic harm, not personal physical injuries. The case concerned
a drug approved by the FDA for treatment of epilepsy and
136
neuralgia.
The plaintiffs accused the drug’s brand-name
manufacturer of illegally promoting the drug for other, unapproved
137
uses. The suit was brought as a class action on behalf of everyone
who had purchased the drug, in its brand-name or generic form, with
138
prescriptions written for off-label uses. The plaintiffs did not claim
to have been physically harmed by taking the drug; they simply
139
sought refunds of the money they paid for it. Insisting that it had no
duty to consumers who purchased other companies’ products, the
brand-name manufacturer sought summary judgment on the claims of
all class members who received the generic rather than the brand140
name version of the drug. The trial judge denied the motion,
rejecting the argument that a brand-name manufacturer has no duty
141
to those who receive the generic version of its product. The judge
reasoned that if the brand-name manufacturer fraudulently
encouraged doctors to believe the drug was suitable for nonapproved
uses, some patients would wind up receiving the generic drug for
142
those off-label uses. The judge thus saw no reason to draw a
distinction between patients who took the generic drug and those who
took the brand-name product, because all were harmed in equally
143
foreseeable ways by the brand-name manufacturer’s wrongdoing.

134. Clark v. Pfizer Inc., No. 1819, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 74 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar.
14, 2008).
135. Id. at *30–32.
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *2. Indeed, as part of a plea agreement to a criminal charge, one of the drug’s
manufacturers had agreed to pay a $240 million fine and to stop promoting the drug for off-label
use. Id.
138. Id. at *1.
139. See id. at *30 (discussing the validity of plaintiffs’ “claims for reimbursement of sums
spent”).
140. Id. at *1.
141. See id. at *28–30 (applying a five-factor test to determine that the brand-name
manufacturer owed a duty to those who received the generic version of the drug). The judge,
however, ruled that the manufacturer could not be held liable for breach of warranty to those
who did not purchase its product. Id. at *1, *31.
142. Id. at *21–22.
143. Much of the brand-name manufacturer’s alleged wrongdoing in the Clark case occurred
while the brand-name drug was still under patent protection and no generic version of the drug
was even available. Id. at *19–20. This did not deter the judge from ruling that the brand-name
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The Clark ruling thus made another small dent in the line of
144
precedent after Foster, but it drew little attention. The California
Court of Appeal was, however, about to deliver a more significant
blow.
C. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.
Elizabeth Conte was about sixty years old when she began to
experience problems with food from her stomach backing up into her
145
throat. After about a month of discomfort from this condition,
146
commonly known as heartburn or acid reflux, Conte saw a doctor
147
148
about the problem. She then began taking metoclopramide, a
prescription drug manufactured and sold by Wyeth, Inc. under the
brand name Reglan but also produced by a number of generic
149
manufacturers. The drug essentially blocks reception of certain
neurotransmitters, thereby stimulating gastrointestinal nerves and
muscles to make the stomach empty more rapidly into the
150
intestines.
In 2003, about three years after she started taking the drug,
Conte began to experience mild involuntary movements of her
151
mouth. The condition soon worsened, with the uncontrollable
152
movements of her mouth and tongue becoming more severe.
153
Conte’s toes began to move involuntarily as well. Conte saw a
neurologist who determined that she was suffering from a
neurological disorder known as tardive dyskinesia, caused by her
manufacturer might be liable to those who eventually took the generic drug because the brandname manufacturer could easily foresee that generic versions of the drug would become
available as soon as the brand-name drug’s patent expired. Id. at *21–22.
144. The judge later decertified the plaintiff class. Clark v. Pfizer Inc., No. 1819, 2009 WL
1725953, at *6 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 20, 2009), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 990 A.2d 17 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2010).
145. See Respondent Wyeth’s Brief at 4, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct.
App. 2008) (Nos. A116707, A117353), 2008 WL 684752.
146. See generally John F. Johanson, Epidemiology of Esophageal and Supraesophageal
Reflux Injuries, 108 AM. J. MED. 99S, 99S (Supp. 4A 2000) (equating individuals suffering from
“symptoms of heartburn” with people suffering from gastroesophageal reflux disease).
147. Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 4.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1.
150. See Reglan, RXLIST, http://www.rxlist.com/reglan-drug.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
151. Complaint for Damages ¶ 20, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. CGC-04-437382 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Dec. 2, 2005), 2005 WL 5168019.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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long-term use of metoclopramide to treat her heartburn symptoms.
Tardive dyskinesia produces persistent, repetitive involuntary
movements, particularly in the muscles of the lower face. These
movements, including facial grimacing and tongue thrusting, “are
155
often severe, distressing, and incapacitating,” and may lead to life156
threatening respiratory difficulties. No cure exists for tardive
dyskinesia, and little can be done to treat the condition once it has
157
begun.
Conte filed a lawsuit against her doctor, the manufacturer of the
brand-name drug, and three companies that produced the drug in
158
generic form. She acknowledged that she consumed only the
159
generic versions of the drug.
Significant confusion soon arose about the facts surrounding
Conte’s prescriptions for the drug. Conte alleged that she took the
drug, which her gastroenterologist prescribed, from about August
160
2000 until about April 2004. The doctor, however, denied that he
161
had ever prescribed the drug for Conte. Pharmacy records seemed
to show otherwise, indicating that Conte had received the drug,
162
pursuant to prescriptions from the doctor, for at least two years.
Moreover, the doctor’s assistant testified that she authorized a
163
pharmacy to refill Conte’s prescription on some occasions.
Given that such confusion existed about the simple issue of
whether Conte even received a prescription, it is not surprising that
the evidence was also unclear on the more complex question of why
154. Id.
155. M. L’E. Orme & R.C. Tallis, Metoclopramide and Tardive Dyskinesia in the Elderly,
289 BRIT. MED. J. 397, 398 (1984).
156. M. Reza Samie, Mary Anne Dannenhoffer & Susan Rozek, Life-Threatening Tardive
Dyskinesia Caused by Metoclopramide, 2 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 125, 125 (1987).
157. Orme & Tallis, supra note 155, at 398.
158. Complaint for Damages, supra note 151, ¶¶ 2–14. The brand-name drug was initially
produced by A.H. Robins Co., which was later acquired by Wyeth. Brief of Appellant, supra
note 33, at 2 n.1. In 2001, during the period when Conte was taking the drug, Wyeth sold the
rights to produce the brand-name product to another company, Schwarz Pharma, Inc. Id. at 3
n.1. Conte therefore asserted claims against both Wyeth and Schwarz Pharma as producers of
the brand-name drug. Complaint for Damages, supra note 151, ¶¶ 2–4. For simplicity’s sake,
this Article will discuss the situation as though there was only one brand-name manufacturer of
the drug; that there were actually two does not affect the analysis.
159. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309 (Ct. App. 2008).
160. Complaint for Damages, supra note 151, ¶¶ 17, 19.
161. Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9.
162. Id. at 8–9, 9 n.6.
163. Id. at 9.
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Conte’s doctor prescribed the drug for her. Conte claimed that the
doctor relied on information that the brand-name manufacturer
164
In his
disseminated through the Physicians’ Desk Reference.
deposition, the doctor acknowledged that he probably had read the
information about the drug in that book at some point during the
residency period at the beginning of his medical career, that he
believed the information he had read was accurate, and that the
Physicians’ Desk Reference generally was one of the sources he would
165
refer to in prescribing Reglan for his patients. The brand-name
manufacturer, however, was able to obtain an affidavit from the
doctor stating that he did not rely on the Physicians’ Desk Reference
or any other information from the brand-name manufacturer in
166
deciding on a course of treatment for Conte. It is hard to know what
to make of the affidavit, given that the doctor denied even having
prescribed the drug. In any event, whatever the doctor knew about
the drug appeared to have come from the brand-name manufacturer
and not the generic producers. Conte conceded that there was no
evidence the doctor ever saw the generic products’ labeling or any
167
other information generated by the generic manufacturers.
Whether the drug’s labeling contained adequate warnings about
the risk of tardive dyskinesia was another hotly disputed issue in the
case. As early as 1978, articles in medical journals had raised concerns
168
about a link between metoclopramide and tardive dyskinesia. The
evidence of an association between the drug and this disorder quickly
169
accumulated, and in 1985 the FDA required manufacturers of

164. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307–08; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9.
165. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308 & n.6; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9;
Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 28.
166. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 9; Respondent
Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 28.
167. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318; Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 10.
168. See M. Kataria, M. Traub & C.D. Marsden, Extrapyramidal Side-Effects of
Metoclopramide, 312 LANCET 1254, 1254 (1978) (“Metoclopramide has been associated with
chronic tardive dyskinesia . . . .”); S. Lavy, E. Melamed & S. Penchas, Tardive Dyskinesia
Associated with Metoclopramide, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 61, 77 (1978) (“Recently, acute facial
dyskinesias . . . have been reported . . . shortly after administration of low doses of
metoclopramide.”); see also S. Melmed & H. Bank, Metoclopramide and Facial Dyskinesia, 1
BRIT. MED. J. 293, 331 (1975) (reporting two cases of acute or short-term episodes of facial
dyskinesia by patients taking metoclopramide, but noting that they “seem to be unique and may
signify an individual sensitivity to the drug”).
169. See, e.g., J. David Grimes, Parkinsonism and Tardive Dyskinesia Associated with LongTerm Metoclopramide Therapy, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1417, 1417 (1981) (noting that
“metoclopramide-induced parkinsonism and tardive dyskinesia have become frequent
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metoclopramide to add a warning to the drug’s labeling about this
170
risk. The warning stated that the drug was to be used as “short-term
(4 to 12 weeks) therapy” for patients whose acid reflux failed to
respond to other treatments, and that use for periods longer than
twelve weeks “has not been evaluated and cannot be
171
recommended.” The labeling noted that “approximately 1 in 500
patients” showed symptoms of neurological movement disorders
172
within a short time after beginning to take the drug. It went on to
warn that the drug could cause tardive dyskinesia, particularly among
elderly women, and that “[b]oth the risk of developing the syndrome
and the likelihood that it will become irreversible are believed to
increase with the duration of treatment and the total cumulative
173
dose.”
According to the drug’s manufacturers, these warnings sufficed
to apprise doctors of the risk of tardive dyskinesia from long-term use
174
of metoclopramide.
Many plaintiffs like Conte have argued
otherwise, pointing out that studies actually suggested the risk of
developing tardive dyskinesia from long-term use of the drug might
be more than one hundred times greater than the one-in-five-hundred
175
figure mentioned on the drug’s labeling. Although the label
specified that the one-in-five-hundred statistic was for short-term use
and that the risk for long-term users was believed to be higher,
mentioning the low number and then merely saying that the odds
diagnoses”); J. David Grimes, Mohamed N. Hassan & David N. Preston, Adverse Neurologic
Effects of Metoclopramide, 126 CAN. MED. ASS’N J., 23, 23 (1982) (noting “a frequent
association between the long-term use of metoclopramide and a parkinsonian syndrome that
was often followed by tardive dyskinesia”); Norman A. Leopold, Prolonged MetoclopramideInduced Dyskinetic Reaction, 34 NEUROLOGY 238, 238 (1984) (“A prolonged acute dyskinetic
reaction due to metoclopramide . . . is herein described.”).
170. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W.
3745, 79 U.S.L.W. 3017, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1501).
171. PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2714–15 (55th ed. 2001).
172. Id. at 2714.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 369–72 (5th Cir. 2006) (reviewing and rejecting
the manufacturer’s argument that its warnings about tardive dsykinesia were adequate).
175. See Linda Ganzini, Daniel E. Casey, William F. Hoffman & Anthony L. McCall, The
Prevalence of Metoclopramide-Induced Tardive Dyskinesia and Acute Extrapyramidal
Movement Disorders, 153 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1469, 1469 (1993) (“Metoclopramide use is
associated with a significantly increased prevalence and severity of several extrapyramidal
movement disorders.”); Daniel D. Sewell, Angela B. Kodsi, Michael P. Caligiuri & Dilip V.
Jeste, Metoclopramide and Tardive Dyskinesia, 36 BIOL. PSYCH. 630, 631 (1994) (finding “that
[metoclopramide]-associated [tardive dyskinesia] may be frequent, mild to moderate in severity,
and persistent”).
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might be higher for long-term users “does not put a physician on
notice that the increase in risk is of a completely different order of
magnitude” and therefore could be considered misleading and
176
inadequate. Moreover, plaintiffs like Conte also pointed to evidence
showing that drug makers knew that doctors routinely continued to
prescribe the drug for long-term use despite the label’s statement that
177
it was not recommended for use beyond twelve weeks.
The drug companies in Conte’s case did not want to face a jury
on those issues. They therefore took the position that even if the
drug’s labeling was inadequate, no manufacturer could be held
responsible because Conte’s doctor obtained information about the
drug only from the brand-name manufacturer, whereas Conte’s
178
pharmacist gave her only the generic versions of the drug. Conte
thus found herself in the same dilemma that had snared the Fosters
and many other plaintiffs in previous cases.
The trial court dismissed all of Conte’s claims against the drug
makers. On appeal, she faced the solid wall of precedent following
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Foster and rejecting the idea that a
brand-name drug manufacturer could be liable for harm suffered by
179
those taking generic equivalents of its product.
The California Court of Appeal, however, fired a forceful shot at
that wall by ruling in favor of Conte on her claims against the brand180
name manufacturer. The court began by recognizing that a genuine
factual dispute existed about whether Conte’s doctor had relied on

176. McNeil, 462 F.3d at 370; see also Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 7 (“The
information disseminated by Wyeth and the generic defendants, whether through the PDR, in
metoclopramide package inserts, or otherwise, was materially false, incomplete, and/or
misleading . . . .”).
177. See McNeil, 462 F.3d at 369 (stating that the drug maker’s market data indicated an 84
percent rate of long-term use); Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 7 (noting the drug maker’s
internal data and access to independent studies); R.B. Stewart, Metoclopramide: An Analysis of
Inappropriate Long-Term Use in the Elderly, 26 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 977, 977–78
(1992) (demonstrating that 32.4 percent of surveyed metoclopramide patients had been using it
for over one year).
178. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 305–06 (Ct. App. 2008). The generic
manufacturers also argued that federal law preempted the claims against them. Id. Indeed, only
one of the generic manufacturers actually pressed the argument about not having supplied
information to Conte’s doctor, although that argument turned out to be the means by which all
three ultimately escaped liability for Conte’s injuries. Id. at 318–20.
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 309–18.

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

1155

181

Wyeth’s alleged misrepresentations about its product. The court
then held that although Conte could have strict products liability
claims only against those who manufactured or sold the product she
consumed, no similar limit applied to a negligent misrepresentation
182
claim. The court further found that the brand-name manufacturer
owed a duty to Conte because it was foreseeable that the generic drug
makers would copy the brand-name drug’s labeling and that
pharmacists would fill prescriptions for brand-name drugs with their
183
generic equivalents. Concluding that the brand-name manufacturer
therefore should not be able to avoid responsibility to someone like
Conte who fortuitously happened to receive the generic drug, the
court emphasized that its decision was “rooted in common sense and
184
California common law” and was “not marking out new territory.”
Although ruling against the brand-name drug manufacturer, the
California Court of Appeal went the other way on Conte’s claims
185
against the generic drug makers. The court noted that although
Conte took the generic versions of the drug, she had no evidence that
her doctor ever read or relied upon any labeling or other information
186
generated by the generic drug manufacturers. Even if the generic
drug makers’ warnings were inadequate, the court reasoned, they
could not be the cause of Conte’s injuries if her doctor never looked
187
at them. The court therefore concluded that Conte could proceed
with her claims against the brand-name manufacturer but not the
generic drug producers. The decision was an odd converse of the
result in Foster, in which the Fourth Circuit rejected the claims
against the brand-name manufacturer but suggested the generic
188
producer should have been held liable.
In one respect, however, the Conte and Foster cases had parallel
outcomes. In early 2009, the FDA ordered manufacturers of
metoclopramide, the drug taken by Elizabeth Conte, to start putting a

181. Id. at 308 (“[T]here are disputed factual issues as to both the accuracy of Dr. Elsen’s
recollection and, even if he did not specifically refer to the PDR when he formulated Conte’s
treatment, whether information he had previously garnered from the PDR was a substantial
factor in his decision to prescribe Reglan for her.”).
182. Id. at 309–11.
183. Id. at 311–13.
184. Id. at 311.
185. Id. at 318–20.
186. Id. at 318.
187. Id. at 319.
188. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
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black box warning at the top of their labeling, emphasizing the risk of
189
tardive dyskinesia and advising against long-term use. The FDA
found that, despite the weaker warnings previously given, many
doctors were still prescribing the drug for periods longer than three
months, and that metoclopramide had become the nation’s leading
190
cause of drug-induced movement disorders. The FDA’s action, like
its similar move to require a black box warning about the drug
191
involved in Foster, underscores that the plaintiffs in these cases
raised genuinely serious questions about the adequacy of the
warnings being given by the drug companies.
D. The Reaction to Conte
The California Court of Appeal’s decision in Conte immediately
drew scathing criticism from commentators. An influential blog on
legal issues relating to pharmaceutical companies declared that Conte
192
“effectively stands product liability law on its head.” Others
similarly expressed surprise at the California court’s decision, calling
193
194
it a “stunning” and “remarkable” decision that “sen[t] the
195
pharmaceutical defense bar reeling.”
Given that it involved a significant issue of first impression in the
state and reached conclusions that differed from most precedent in
other jurisdictions, the Conte decision seemed to be a likely candidate
for review by the Supreme Court of California. A slew of amicus
filings asked the Supreme Court of California to hear the case and to

189. See Elizabeth Mechcatie, Stronger Warning on Dyskinesia Risk Required for
Metoclopramide, CLINICAL NEUROLOGY NEWS, May/June 2009, at 14, 14 (“The chronic use of
metoclopramide therapy should be avoided in all but rare cases . . . .” (quoting Dr. Janet
Woodcock, Director, FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research)).
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
192. James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Generic Drug—Pioneer Liability, DRUG & DEVICE
L. (Nov. 7, 2008, 4:10 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/11/generic-drug-pioneerliabilty.html.
193. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Brand Name Manufacturer Liable for Generics Made by
Competitor, TORTSPROF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2008, 11:17 AM), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
tortsprof/2008/week46/index.html.
194. James R. Phelps, Am I My (Generic) Brother’s Keeper? In California, Yes., FDA L.
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2008/11/am-imy-generic-brothers-keeper-in-california-yes.html.
195. Melissa Maleske, Brand-Name Burdens: California Decision on Generic Drug Liability
Upends 14 Years of Precedent, INSIDE COUNSEL, Feb. 2009, at 20, 20.
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196

The California high court
reverse the lower court’s ruling.
nevertheless declined to review the matter, clearing the way for the
197
case to return to the trial court and work its way toward a trial.
The Conte case thus created a distinct split of judicial authority.
In the years since the Conte decision, a multitude of other courts that
have faced the issue have followed Foster and rejected Conte’s
conclusion that a brand-name manufacturer could be liable to a
198
patient who took the generic version of the drug. To the extent
these courts have mentioned Conte, they have dismissed it as “the
lone outlier against the overwhelming weight of authority on this
199
point.” The Conte decision also continues to be roundly condemned
by defense lawyers and other commentators. Conte is an

196. The organizations filing briefs in support of the brand-name drug manufacturer
included the California Health Institute, the California Manufacturers & Technology
Association, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, and the Product Liability Advisory Council. More complete information about the
amicus filings can be found in the docket for the Conte case. Docket (Register of Actions): Conte
v. Wyeth Inc. et al., CAL. APPELLATE CTS.: CASE INFO., http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/
search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=1&doc_id=534293&doc_no=A117353 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
197. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No. S169116, 2009 Cal. LEXIS 233, at *1 (Cal. Jan. 21, 2009).
198. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 612–14 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W. 3522, 79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W.
3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-993), and Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, 78 U.S.L.W.
3523, 79 U.S.L.W. 3014, 79 U.S.L.W. 3353, 79 U.S.L.W. 3358 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 09-1039);
Gross v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 10-CV-00110-AW, 2010 WL 4485774, at *2–3 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2010);
Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2010 WL 3632747, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17,
2010); Johnson v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:10 CV 404, 2010 WL 3271934, at *3 (W.D. La.
Aug. 16, 2010); Fisher v. Pelstring, No. 4:09-cv-00252-TLW, 2010 WL 2998474, at *6 (D.S.C. July
28, 2010); Neal v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 09-CV-1027, 2010 WL 2640170, at *2 (W.D. Ark.
July 1, 2010); Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-0284-KD-C, 2010 WL 2594000, *6 (S.D. Ala. June
28, 2010); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-6168-TC, 2010 WL 2553619, at *2–3 (D. Or. May 28,
2010); Craig v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:10-00227, 2010 WL 2649545, at *4 (W.D. La. May 26, 2010);
Finnicum v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-785, 2010 WL 1718204, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2010);
Howe v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-610-T-17AEP, 2010 WL 1708857, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26,
2010); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 643, 646 (W.D.N.C. 2010); Hardy v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 9:09CV152, 2010 WL 1049588, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2010); Levine v. Wyeth Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 2d 1338, 1343–45 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-0854, 2009 WL 4064103,
at *4 (W.D. La. Nov. 23, 2009); Meade v. Parsley, No. 2:09-cv-00388, 2009 WL 3806716, at *2–3
(S.D. W. Va. Nov. 13, 2009); Burke v. Wyeth, Inc., No. G-09-82, 2009 WL 3698480, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 29, 2009); Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631, 634 (E.D.N.C. 2009); Fields v.
Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 WL 749532, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601
F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266–67 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Cousins v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0310N, 2009 WL 648703, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2009).
199. Dietrich v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 50-2009-CA-021586 XXX MB, slip op. at 10 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 21, 2009), 2009 WL 4924722.
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“aberration,” its critics argue, “which belies the policy and precedent
200
of products-liability law.”
The California Court of Appeal does not stand completely alone,
however, for a federal district court judge in Vermont has joined it in
recognizing that a brand-name manufacturer could be liable for
201
injuries caused by the generic version of its drug. After discussing
the Foster and Conte precedents and acknowledging that they might
provide helpful insights, the federal court undertook a careful analysis
of Vermont tort law and concluded that “[t]here is no reason, under
Vermont law, to limit [a brand-name manufacturer’s] duty of care to
physicians by the pharmacist’s choice of a generic bioequivalent drug
202
to fill the physician’s prescription.” The federal court’s ruling
suggests that Conte ultimately may turn out to be more influential
and less of an aberrational outlier than its critics expected.
III. ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT BRAND-NAME
MANUFACTURERS’ LIABILITY FOR GENERIC DRUG INJURIES
In turning to the many arguments presented on both sides of the
issue, there are some initial areas of basic confusion that have clouded

200. Ahmann & Verneris, supra note 11, at 789.
201. Kellogg v. Wyeth, No. 2:07-cv-00082, slip op. at 19–34 (D. Vt. Oct. 20, 2010).
202. Id. at 31. Prior to the court’s ruling in Kellogg, the plaintiff submitted to the court a
copy of a pre-publication draft of this Article, and the court ordered the parties to submit
supplemental briefs addressing it. The Kellogg plaintiff suggested that the Article makes
“substantial and positive contributions to the understanding of these cases and the issues
presented in them,” but “miss[es] the mark” in many ways, particularly with respect to the role
of causation and reliance in misrepresentation claims versus failure to warn claims. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum Concerning Pertinent Aspects of the Rostron Article at 2, Kellogg, No. 2:07-cv00082. In addition, preferring a simple rule of joint and several liability for all defendants
responsible for an injury, the plaintiff objected to this Article’s proposed framework for
allocating liability between brand-name and generic manufacturers. Id. at 12–14; see also infra
Part IV.B. On the other hand, the brand-name manufacturer in Kellogg characterized the
Article as being concerned primarily with situations where a plaintiff who took a generic drug
would be left with no remedy whatsoever if the drug’s brand-name manufacturer escaped
liability. Wyeth’s Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1–3, Kellogg, No. 2:07-cv-00082. The manufacturer argued that no need existed for
adopting the Article’s “novel theories” in a case where the plaintiff might have viable claims
against generic drug manufacturers and against her doctor. Id. at 4–5. In fact, situations where
an injured plaintiff would have no tort remedies against anyone illustrate most starkly the
unfairness of letting brand-name manufacturers avoid responsibility for harm caused by their
negligence, but the unfairness is by no means limited to those situations. Despite giving careful
consideration to both parties’ assessments, I was not moved by their critiques. Indeed, taking
fire from both sides encouraged me to hope that the approach proposed in this Article balances
well the competing interests at stake.
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the question and often have prevented litigants, courts, and
commentators from zeroing in on equitable and policy considerations
that should be the focal points of the debate. Clearing away these
preliminary sources of confusion will not resolve the ultimate issue
under consideration here, but it will set the stage for a more lucid and
productive discussion. After trying to shed light on the matters that
have distracted and misled analyses in the past, I turn to the equity
and policy considerations that should drive efforts to develop
approaches fair to injured plaintiffs, brand-name manufacturers, and
generic drug makers.
A. Negligence versus Strict Liability Claims
Determining the proper scope of drug companies’ liability
requires careful attention to distinctions among the several different
causes of action that can be asserted in products liability cases.
Products liability is a broad term that covers an entire field of law
203
containing several different types of claims and legal theories. Some
products liability claims require proof that the defendant was
negligent, but others, like strict tort liability and breach of warranty,
204
do not necessarily require any proof of fault. Those “untutored in
the finer points of products liability law sometimes casually
interchange the terms ‘strict liability’ and ‘products liability,’” but
“[s]uch usage is imprecise and should be avoided, because it equates a
205
single theory of liability with an entire field of law.”
Drug manufacturers and other critics of Conte often have failed
to fully respect these crucial distinctions. They point to judicial
decisions that discuss the purposes and limits of strict liability claims
but misread the decisions as addressing all tort claims, even those not
206
involving any form of strict liability. For example, when the
Supreme Court of California first ruled in Greenman v. Yuba Power
207
Products, Inc. that strict tort liability should be imposed on
manufacturers of defective products, it stated that “[t]he purpose of
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such

203. See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
205. OWEN, supra note 60, § 5.1, at 254.
206. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 310–11 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting the
brand-name drug manufacturer’s misplaced reliance on numerous strict tort liability cases).
207. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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208

products on the market.” Critics of the Conte decision contend that
this is the “bedrock rationale for product liability” and that Conte
209
contradicts it. The court in Greenman, however, made very clear
that it was talking about strict tort liability, not all tort claims or even
210
all products liability claims. To contend otherwise, critics of Conte
have engaged in a subtle sleight of hand that improperly equates strict
liability with products liability and stretches these terms to cover
negligence and all other tort claims that could ever be brought against
manufacturers.
Although Greenman and countless other cases established that
strict liability applies only to the manufacturer and other sellers that
211
put the allegedly defective product on the market, Conte does not
undercut or contradict that proposition in any way. Indeed, the Conte
decision did not say anything whatsoever about expanding the reach
of strict liability. It instead specifically emphasized that strict liability
cannot apply to a brand-name manufacturer when the plaintiff took a
212
generic drug made by another company. At the same time, the court
recognized that “[n]egligence and strict products liability are separate
and distinct bases for liability” and that they “do not automatically
collapse into each other” merely because there are some situations in
213
which a plaintiff might be able to assert both types of claims.
Strict liability is unusual. Tort law generally imposes liability only
on those who were at fault, either through negligence or intentional
214
wrongdoing. Strict liability is thus a rare and exceptional condition,
whereas being liable for injuries caused by one’s negligence is the
norm. The limits on the reach of strict liability claims should be
carefully respected, but when a situation is outside those limits, it
does not fall into some sort of bizarre twilight zone in which
defendants have immunity from all liability. Instead, the normal rules
of tort law apply, including the principles providing that defendants

208. Id. at 901.
209. E.g., James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, More Thoughts on Conte v. Wyeth, DRUG &
DEVICE L. (Nov. 13, 2008, 4:52 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/11/morethoughts-on-conte-v-wyeth.html.
210. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
211. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
212. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 311 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he defendant
would not be liable in strict products liability because it did not manufacture or sell the
product.”).
213. Id. at 310.
214. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 263–66 (2000).
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who cause foreseeable harm through unreasonably careless behavior
generally can be held liable for their negligence. Though a brandname drug manufacturer may not be held strictly liable for harm to
patients who took its product’s generic counterpart, the
manufacturer’s potential liability for negligence is a separate matter
that must be resolved through careful analysis.
B. Indeterminate Tortfeasor versus Additional Tortfeasor Scenarios
The other major point of confusion that has plagued the debate
over these issues is a failure to distinguish between two different
types of situations in which a plaintiff might assert claims against
more than one manufacturer. In some instances, a plaintiff sues
multiple manufacturers simply because the true identity of a
product’s manufacturer is in doubt. In other instances, the identity of
the product’s manufacturer is well known, but the plaintiff sues
multiple manufacturers because one engaged in some conduct, other
than manufacturing the product, that was tortious and contributed to
causing plaintiff’s injury. These two different situations have been
continually conflated and confused with one another in the debate
over brand-name and generic drug manufacturer liability.
Consider a scenario that does not involve products. Suppose
several people fired guns in a plaintiff’s direction, and the plaintiff
wound up being struck by one bullet. To recover damages, the
plaintiff would generally need to identify the person who shot her.
The plaintiff would figure out whose bullet hit her, and then simply
sue that person. If the plaintiff could not determine which person shot
her, she might still be able to recover under one of several special tort
theories. For example, if the people firing guns engaged in a
concerted effort to harm the plaintiff, then all of them would be
jointly liable for the harm no matter who fired the bullet that actually
215
found its target. Even absent such concerted or joint action, the
theory of alternative liability could enable the plaintiff to sue and to
216
hold liable all who negligently fired the shots toward her.
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he does a tortious act in
concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him . . . .”).
216. Invented by the Supreme Court of California, alternative liability has been widely
embraced by other courts. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3–5 (Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden
of proof to the defendants and concluding that each defendant would be liable unless he is able
to prove it was not his shot that caused the plaintiff’s injury); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) (“Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved
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Those situations in which the plaintiff cannot determine the
identity of the person whose bullet struck her must be carefully
distinguished from situations in which the plaintiff has no doubts
about whose bullet hit her body, but she nevertheless has grounds for
asserting tort claims against more than one person. Assume, for
example, that the evidence makes clear that John fired the shot that
hit the plaintiff. In addition to whatever claims she may have against
John, the plaintiff may have claims against David as well if she can
prove that David engaged in some sort of tortious conduct that was a
cause of the injury. For example, if David should have known that
John was mentally unstable and violent, but nevertheless gave him
the gun used to shoot the plaintiff, David might be liable for negligent
217
entrustment of the firearm. If David negligently mistook the
plaintiff for a deer and then convinced John to shoot in the plaintiff’s
direction, David could be liable even though he did not fire the bullet
218
that hit the plaintiff. Likewise, if David negligently told the plaintiff
that it was safe to enter a spot at which David knew or had reason to
219
know that bullets would be flying, David could be liable. David
similarly might be liable if his negligent operation of a shooting range
220
led the plaintiff to be hit by a bullet fired by John, if he negligently
221
published a book that advised John on how to shoot the plaintiff, or
222
if he negligently supplied a faulty bulletproof vest to the plaintiff. In
these and an endless variety of other imaginable scenarios, David
might be held liable for his negligence, despite the fact that he did not

that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to
which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.”).
217. See, e.g., Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1208 (Fla. 1997) (holding that a
negligent entrustment action is proper when a person provides a firearm to an intoxicated
person); Estate of Heck ex rel. Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 271 (Ind. 2003) (articulating a
duty to exercise reasonable care in the storage of a firearm to prevent access and use by a third
party).
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311(1) (1965) (“One who negligently gives
false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by
the other in reasonable reliance upon such information . . . .”).
219. See id.
220. See Dionne v. City of Trenton, 261 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
221. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the
publisher of an instructional book used by a hit man to plan a contract killing could be “civilly
liable for aiding and abetting” the murder).
222. See House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 348 (Utah 1996) (finding a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the manufacturer and the distributor of body armor owed
the plaintiff, a SWAT team officer, a duty to warn him of the limitations of their product).
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fire the bullet that struck the plaintiff. David’s liability in these
scenarios does not depend on any of the special theories, like
alternative liability, that apply in situations in which the plaintiff is
unable to determine who shot her. Those theories are irrelevant when
it is clear that David is not the one who shot the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff nevertheless sues David for some other tortious conduct that
contributed to her injury.
The same logic applies when the plaintiff suffered harm from use
of a drug or other product. In some instances, the plaintiff may not be
able to determine which of several manufacturers produced the
particular dose she received. In those situations, the plaintiff will need
to invoke one of the special tort theories—concert of action,
alternative liability, enterprise liability, or market share liability—that
223
might overcome her inability to identify the product’s manufacturer.
The availability of those theories should be irrelevant, however, when
the plaintiff can identify the product’s manufacturer but nevertheless
has claims against some other manufacturer who engaged in some
other tortious conduct that was also a cause of the plaintiff’s injury. In
other words, a manufacturer could be sued not because it made or
might have made the product in question but because it was simply an
additional tortfeasor liable for some form of wrongdoing other than
making and selling the product the plaintiff received.
The distinction between an indeterminate manufacturer and an
additional tortfeasor seems simple. Yet defendants and judges have
often blurred and confused the two in cases about the liability of
brand-name and generic drug makers. The trouble dates all the way
back to the Foster case, in which the brand-name manufacturer’s
arguments focused heavily on the unavailability of nonidentification
theories, such as alternative liability and market share liability, that

223. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 11.3, at 782–90 (defining market share liability, alternative
liability, enterprise liability, and concert-of-action liability). Each of these four theories has been
applied to product manufacturers. See Dawson v. Bristol Labs., 658 F. Supp. 1036, 1038–40
(W.D. Ky. 1987) (discussing concert of action and finding that the plaintiff had stated a valid
claim under a concert-of-action theory); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353, 376–78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (explaining the rationale underlying enterprise liability and
allowing the plaintiff’s action to proceed under that theory); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d
924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (explaining that under market share liability, “[e]ach defendant will be held
liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it
demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries”);
Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 473 N.E.2d 1199, 1200 (Ohio 1984) (endorsing the doctrine of
alternative liability found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B)).

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

1164

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1123

224

were irrelevant to the case. Biting into the red herring offered by
the drug manufacturer, the Fourth Circuit similarly emphasized the
unavailability of those theories and failed to confront squarely the
idea that the brand-name manufacturer could be liable as an
additional tortfeasor even though it did not make the drug that killed
225
Brandy Foster. Throughout the long line of precedent that flowed
out of Foster, courts have repeatedly made the same mistake,
dwelling on the irrelevant concept of liability being imposed on
multiple manufacturers because of uncertainty about who made a
product and conflating that concept with the separate and distinct
issue of whether a manufacturer can be liable for wrongdoing other
226
than making and selling the product the plaintiff received.
The indeterminate manufacturer and additional tortfeasor
scenarios implicate fundamentally different concerns. The former
raises important questions about the appropriate judicial response to
227
the inevitability of factual uncertainty in the world, whereas the
latter often presents equally profound—but very different—questions
about the complex web of causal factors underlying events, the nature
and degree of connection courts should demand between a
defendant’s actions and a plaintiff’s injury, and the proper scope or
limits of one’s obligations toward others. The issue of brand-name
and generic drug makers’ liability is complicated and difficult enough
without being obscured in a tangle of irrelevant issues.

224. See Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 13–15 (arguing that under
Maryland law, the plaintiff in a products liability action must be able to identify the defendant’s
product as the source of the plaintiff’s injury).
225. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing case law
establishing that “Maryland law refused to adopt non-identification theories of product
liability”).
226. See, e.g., Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266–67 (W.D. Okla. 2009)
(citing Oklahoma’s rejection of market share liability, alternative liability, concert-of-action
liability, and enterprise liability theories in granting summary judgment to the defendants);
Sharp v. Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at *2–3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006)
(concluding that the principles of market share liability foreclosed the imposition of liability on
defendants who could positively show that they did not manufacture the drug ingested by the
plaintiff), aff’d per curiam, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
227. See Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 158 (2004) (explaining that market
share liability responds to situations in which the plaintiff has been injured by one of several
defendants but cannot easily identify which particular defendant actually caused the injury).
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C. The Elements of Negligence Claims
With those preliminary clarifications in mind, I turn to the
central issue of whether a brand-name drug manufacturer can ever be
liable for negligence that causes a person to be injured by use of the
brand-name drug’s generic equivalent. The plaintiffs’ arguments in
these cases essentially boil down to the straightforward proposition
that brand-name manufacturers should be held liable when plaintiffs
can satisfy all the elements required for establishing negligence
claims. In other words, the plaintiffs do not argue for the creation of
any sort of special rule for their cases. They do not ask courts to bend
or waive the normal requirements for negligence claims. Instead,
plaintiffs simply point to the basic elements required for negligence
liability and contend that those elements can be met.
Everyone has a general duty to exercise the care of a reasonable
person under the circumstances, in order to avoid causing harm to
228
others. Liability for negligence arises when a defendant’s failure to
exercise reasonable care was an actual and proximate cause of harm
229
to the plaintiff. At first blush, at least, it does appear that these basic
elements of a negligence claim can be satisfied in situations, like in
the Foster and Conte cases, in which a plaintiff took a generic drug
but believes the brand-name manufacturer was negligent. For
example, suppose the plaintiff accuses the brand-name manufacturer
of negligently designing the product. The plaintiff would need to
prove that the manufacturer really did fail to exercise reasonable care
in developing the product, and that the type of illness or other injury
caused by the drug was reasonably foreseeable. But if the plaintiff
could do that, the elements of a negligence claim would fall neatly
into place. The brand-name manufacturer could easily foresee that
generic manufacturers would copy its design, at least with respect to
the crucial, active ingredients of the product. It therefore knew that a
flaw in the drug’s design would cause harm not only to those who
take the brand-name version of the drug, but also to those taking the
generic versions. As a result, harm to a plaintiff caused by the faulty

228. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 214, § 117, at 277 (explaining how courts developed “a general
duty or standard of care describing the duty of all persons to exercise ordinary care, meaning
the care of a reasonable person, for the benefit of other persons”); id. § 227, at 578 (“Among
strangers—those who are in no special relationship that may affect duties owed—the default
rule is that everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to others to avoid physical harms.”).
229. See id. §§ 114–115, at 269–73 (discussing the harm and causation requirements in
negligence actions).
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design of a generic drug is a readily foreseeable result of the brandname manufacturer’s negligence.
The same is true when the claim focuses on the adequacy of the
warnings or instructions accompanying the product. At least as a
general matter, the brand-name manufacturer had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in formulating its product labeling. It could readily
foresee that generic manufacturers would copy the labeling and put it
on their generic versions of the drug. As a result, a plaintiff might be
able to show that if the brand-name manufacturer had acted with
reasonable care in preparing its product’s labeling, the plaintiff never
would have been harmed by use of the generic drug. Proving such a
claim may not necessarily be easy. The plaintiff would need to show
that the brand-name manufacturer really did fail to exercise
reasonable care in crafting the warnings and instructions, that the
type of illness or other injury caused by use of the drug was
reasonably foreseeable, and that adequate warnings or instructions
would have altered the doctor’s decisionmaking about the use of the
230
drug so as to prevent the plaintiff from being harmed by it. A
plaintiff might, however, be able to prove all of these elements. The
plaintiff might be able to show, for example, that her doctor never
would have prescribed the drug for the plaintiff if a stronger warning
about a particular risk had been provided. Alternatively, the plaintiff
might be able to show that her doctor still would have prescribed the
drug but would have changed the manner of its use in some way that
would have prevented or reduced the resulting harm, such as
prescribing the drug in a lower dosage, for a shorter period of use, or
with closer monitoring for a particular adverse reaction about which a
warning had been given.
When the plaintiff has taken a generic drug and subsequently
sues the brand-name manufacturer for negligently failing to give
adequate warnings, it should not matter whether the plaintiff’s doctor
looked at the labeling on the brand-name version of the drug (or
some other source of information attributable to the brand-name
manufacturer, such as the drug’s entry in the Physicians’ Desk
Reference) or saw the labeling on the generic version of the drug. The

230. Under the learned intermediary rule, a prescription drug manufacturer generally has a
duty to give adequate warnings and instructions only to doctors, rather than directly to patients.
The rationale for this rule is that when a drug is available only by prescription, the doctor is the
one who really needs the warnings and instructions to make sound decisions about using the
drug in a patient’s treatment. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 9.6, at 630–33.
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required causal link between the inadequate warnings and the
plaintiff’s injury exists either way. If the doctor looked at the brandname labeling, a stronger warning provided there by the brand-name
manufacturer would have reached the doctor. And if the brand-name
manufacturer had provided a stronger warning in its labeling, the
same information would have automatically appeared on the generic
231
labeling, and thus would have reached a doctor who looked only at
that generic labeling. In either event, the plaintiff may plausibly
contend that a stronger warning would have prevented her injuries by
changing her doctor’s decision about the use of the drug.
Many of the cases about brand-name manufacturers’ liability for
generic drug injuries have focused on negligent misrepresentation
232
claims.
Like an inadequate warning claim, a negligent
misrepresentation claim would center on the labeling, advertising, or
other information provided about the product. But it would require
proof that the defendant went further than just failing to provide
important information and instead affirmatively made some false or
233
misleading statement about the product. Like any other negligence
claim, a negligent misrepresentation claim is based on the assertion
that the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care was an actual
234
and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. More specifically, the
plaintiff must show that someone reasonably or justifiably relied on
the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that reliance led to the
235
plaintiff’s injury. This reliance element is a slightly more precise way
of articulating the general requirement, applicable to all negligence
claims, that a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the
236
defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.
231. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168–71 (4th Cir. 1994); Conte
v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 310–11 (Ct. App. 2008).
233. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 117–18 (explaining that a defendant’s mere failure to
communicate potential dangers, as opposed to making an affirmative statement, is normally
insufficient to constitute a misrepresentation).
234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
235. OWEN, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 125–26; id. § 3.3, at 133–34.
236. See id. § 3.2, at 126 (“Typically, causation is embedded in reliance, and proof of the
former often establishes the latter.”). That the brand-name manufacturer’s misrepresentation
may not be the most direct or immediate cause of the injury should not bar the plaintiff’s claim.
A plaintiff merely needs to show that a defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the
injury, not that it was the most direct or immediate cause. For example, if one person
negligently spills gasoline, and another later negligently creates a spark that ignites the gasoline,
both can be held responsible for the resulting fire. See DOBBS, supra note 214, § 186, at 460 (“If
the first actor negligently creates a risk of harm and the second actor negligently triggers the
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A plaintiff suing a brand-name drug manufacturer may be able
to prove these required elements even though she received the
generic version of the drug. The plaintiff might show, for example,
that the brand-name manufacturer falsely overstated the drug’s safety
or understated its risks, that these misstatements occurred because
the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care, and that the
plaintiff’s doctor relied on the misstatements in prescribing the drug.
If the manufacturer had not made false statements about the drug,
the plaintiff’s doctor would have made a different decision about
whether or how to use the drug, and the plaintiff’s injury would have
been avoided or at least reduced. Again, it should not matter whether
the plaintiff’s doctor saw the misrepresentation in materials generated
237
by the brand-name manufacturer or the generic drug manufacturer.
Plaintiffs in these cases thus can establish the prima facie
elements of a negligence claim against the brand-name manufacturer,
whether the focus is on product design, inadequate warnings, or
negligent misrepresentations. That a pharmacy happened to give the
plaintiff the generic version of the drug, rather than the brand-name
product, simply does not preclude establishment of the elements
necessary to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for negligence.
D. The Presence of Additional Tortfeasors in Products
Liability Scenarios
Because plaintiffs can present plausible claims based on the
standard elements of negligence, drug manufacturers must argue for
the creation of a special rule that would trump the normal application
of those elements. Their basic argument is that a drug manufacturer
should be liable only for harm suffered by those who actually used its
238
products.
They contend that a manufacturer should not be
risk, both actors are tortfeasors, both are causes in fact of the harm, and both are commonly
held liable . . . .”).
237. If the doctor saw the misrepresentation in information produced by the brand-name
manufacturer, the doctor’s reliance on the brand-name manufacturer’s misrepresentation may
be direct. But even in the far more rare instances when the doctor saw the misrepresentation
only in the generic labeling, the required reliance is still present, although the chain of events
has one small extra step. The brand-name manufacturer initially made the misrepresentation,
the generic manufacturer relied on that misrepresentation in copying it onto the labeling of the
generic version of the drug, and the plaintiff’s doctor in turn relied on the misrepresentation as
reprinted in the generic drug labeling. Either way, the plaintiff’s injury flows out of reliance on
the brand-name manufacturer’s misstatement about the drug.
238. See, e.g., Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Wyeth
argues . . . that it cannot be held liable to Conte for her injuries caused by generic
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responsible for injuries that did not directly result from the use of its
products, even if those injuries were actual and foreseeable results of
the manufacturer’s negligence. In short, they believe manufacturers
can only be liable qua manufacturers.
The drug makers contend that this limitation on their liability is a
long and well-established principle. “It is hornbook law,” argued the
brand-name manufacturer in the Conte case, “that a product
manufacturer owes no duty to a plaintiff who does not use its
239
Likewise, observers denouncing the Conte decision
product.”
claimed that it has been clear “since the dawn of product liability”
that “[y]ou can only sue the manufacturer of the product that injured
240
you.”
Is that true? Again, it may be for strict liability claims, but such
claims represent an unusual deviation from normal tort law
241
principles. In the realm of negligence, it is far less clear that any
such principle exists.
Consider this example. A plaintiff purchased a new Ford
automobile. Soon after, while driving through an intersection, she was
hit by a truck whose driver negligently failed to stop for a red traffic
light. Although the plaintiff’s car should have been able to withstand
the impact without causing any injury to the plaintiff, a flaw in the
design of the car’s gas tank caused the car to explode, leading the
plaintiff to suffer terrible burn injuries. If the plaintiff asserts tort
claims against both the truck driver and Ford, the truck driver cannot
avoid liability by saying he did not manufacture or sell the plaintiff’s
car. That the truck driver did not manufacture or sell the car would be
irrelevant because he would not be sued on the ground that he
manufactured or sold it; he would be sued because of his negligent
driving.
Now assume that the truck driver happens to work for Toyota
and was delivering a load of new Toyota automobiles when he struck
the plaintiff. The analysis and result do not change. If the plaintiff
sues Toyota, contending that it is liable for the truck driver’s
negligence through respondeat superior, Toyota cannot avoid liability
by saying it is not the company that manufactured the plaintiff’s car.

metoclopramide because Wyeth has no duty to users of the generic version of its products,
which are produced by other manufacturers.”).
239. Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 2.
240. Beck & Herrmann, supra note 192.
241. See supra Part III.A.
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The plaintiff would not be suing Toyota on the ground that it
manufactured the car. The plaintiff would be suing Toyota because,
through its employee, Toyota was negligent in some other respect
that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. To repeat a term used earlier,
Toyota would be an additional tortfeasor even though it was not the
242
manufacturer of the product that the plaintiff purchased.
This hypothetical example is not parallel in all respects to the
issue of brand-name drug manufacturers’ liability for generic drug
injuries. It merely demonstrates the simple proposition that a
manufacturer can be liable, at least in some circumstances, when its
negligence causes a plaintiff to be injured by a product that the
manufacturer did not produce. The manufacturer is not blamed for
manufacturing something it did not manufacture; instead, the
manufacturer is held liable because it was negligent in some other
respect.
To make the hypothetical example somewhat more similar to the
cases involving brand-name and generic drugs, imagine that Toyota
was negligent in some way related to its activities as an automaker,
rather than just through the careless driving of its employee. For
example, suppose that Toyota negligently designed a gas tank and
then licensed the dangerous design to the manufacturer of the
plaintiff’s car; that Toyota went to other automakers, including the
manufacturer of the plaintiff’s car, and convinced them to stop giving
certain types of warnings; or that Toyota carelessly made false
representations about the safety of a very specific component or
feature of the plaintiff’s car. In those situations, Toyota should not be
able to escape liability merely by saying that it did not manufacture or
sell the plaintiff’s car. Courts should instead look carefully at what
Toyota did and decide whether Toyota’s role in influencing the design
of the product or the information disseminated about it was
substantial enough to justify holding Toyota liable for its negligence.
Courts have taken this approach in a wide variety of
circumstances. They have held that liability can be imposed, at least
in some situations, when a defendant did not actually manufacture or
sell the product in question but nevertheless was negligent in a way
that contributed to the danger posed by the product. For example,
courts have held that a nonmanufacturing designer of a product can
be held liable for injuries attributable to the product’s flawed design

242. See supra Part III.B.
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243

or inadequate warnings. A franchisor or trademark licensor can be
held liable if it participated substantially in developing the design of a
244
product even though it did not manufacture the product itself.
Likewise, a defendant that endorsed or certified a product as being
safe can be held liable for negligence even though it did not
245
manufacture or sell the product. A trade association or other
organization that sets insufficient safety standards for a product can
be held liable for negligence even though it did not manufacture or
246
sell the product. A manufacturer that acquires assets from another
company may be obligated in some circumstances to give warnings to
those who purchased products made by the other company in the
247
past. A manufacturer of machines can be held liable when another
company fails to put adequate warnings on replacement parts for the
machines, even though the manufacturer did not make or sell the
243. See Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 590–91 (Tex. 1986) (finding that the
defendant could be held liable for failing to warn about the hazards associated with a soft drink
bottle cap and closure system it designed, even though it did not manufacture or sell the soft
drink bottle that injured the plaintiff); Melissa Evans Buss, Products Liability and Intellectual
Property Licensors, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 299, 311–14 (2000) (reviewing cases and
concluding that a manufacturer can be held liable when it “negligently develops a design, which
is later embodied in a final product by a separate manufacturer, and a third party’s injuries are
caused by their negligent design”).
244. See Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (W.D. Va. 1982) (“[T]here
is authority holding that implied warranty principles do extend to franchisors who promote the
sale of soft drink products but do not actually manufacture or sell the product.”); OWEN, supra
note 60, § 15.4, at 1030–32 (“Courts widely agree that trademark owners and franchisers that
substantially control product safety may be subject to liability for injuries from defective
products made and sold by their licensees.”).
245. See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 682, 684–87 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding
that a magazine publisher would be liable for negligent misrepresentation if one of its magazines
endorsed dangerous shoes as safe after failing to properly test them); OWEN, supra note 60,
§ 15.7, at 1050–52 (reviewing cases and finding that courts hold that certifiers and endorsers can
be liable for negligence even though they are not subject to strict liability).
246. See Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that
the defendant trade association owed the plaintiff a duty of care in setting safety standards for
the manufacturers and retailers of the plaintiff’s swimming pool and diving board); OWEN,
supra note 60, § 15.7, at 1053–56 (explaining that trade associations are not subject to strict
liability but have been held liable in some cases for negligently developing and promulgating
safety standards for products manufactured by their members); id. § 15.7, at 1058 (noting that
other types of standard-setting organizations may be held liable for negligence even though they
do not manufacture or sell the products for which they set standards).
247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13 (1998) (explaining
that a successor manufacturer can be held liable for failing to warn about risks of products made
by the predecessor manufacturer if the successor provides or agrees to provide repair,
replacement parts, or similar services to predecessor’s customers); OWEN, supra note 60, § 15.5,
at 1040–41 (describing these “commonsense principles of responsibility” as “reasonable and
fair”).
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replacement parts in question and put adequate warnings on the parts
248
that it did manufacture and sell. Again, these are just a few
examples of the broad array of imaginable scenarios in which
someone who did not manufacture or sell a product that causes injury
nevertheless can be held liable for negligence that contributes to the
product’s danger and resulting harm. Examples also abound beyond
the realm of tort law. In the intellectual property field, those who
contribute to infringement of a patent, copyright, or trademark can be
249
held liable along with those who actually infringe. And in securities
law, those who assist or support the violation of a securities statute or
rule can be held liable along with those who directly violate the
250
provision.
None of these examples are perfect parallels to the issue of
brand-name and generic drugs. Brand-name drug manufacturers do
not grant licenses to generic drug makers. They do not endorse or
certify the generic manufacturers’ products. Nor do they urge the
generic manufacturers to copy their products or labeling. Instead, the
mimicry of brand-name drug designs and labeling occurs through the
operation of the FDA’s regulatory scheme for approval of generic
251
drugs. The FDA demands that generic drug makers follow in the
brand-name manufacturer’s footsteps if they want to take advantage
of the abbreviated new drug approval mechanism. The brand-name
manufacturer thus does not solicit or encourage duplication of its
products or labeling, but the generic manufacturer does not
unilaterally or unexpectedly choose to imitate the brand-name
manufacturer’s actions. The imitation of the brand-name products is

248. See Clarke Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 591 So. 2d 458, 462 (Ala. 1991) (finding
that the manufacturer of a sander failed to give adequate warning that replacement parts made
by another manufacturer might combust); see also Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 517
N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that the manufacturer of an original part could be held
liable for a design defect even though the plaintiff was actually injured by a replacement part
that was copied from the manufacturer’s design but was not actually produced by the
manufacturer).
249. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”); Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal
Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366–68 (2006) (discussing the availability of both vicarious liability
and contributory liability theories to plaintiffs in copyright and trademark infringement actions).
250. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and
the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 315 (1989) (noting that secondary liability “has become
so well established in the securities law that courts rarely question its basis”).
251. See supra Part I.A–B.
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systematic and overseen by the FDA, making it not only highly
foreseeable to the brand-name manufacturer but also effectively
subject to the brand-name manufacturer’s control. If the generic drug
is an insufficiently close copy of the brand-name product, for
example, the brand-name manufacturer can have the FDA remove
252
the generic drug from the market. Likewise, if the brand-name
manufacturer determines that the product’s warnings or instructions
should be enhanced in some way, the FDA will force generic
producers of the drug to fall perfectly in line behind the brand-name
253
manufacturer’s lead. The unique regulatory scheme surrounding
prescription drugs thus provides a mechanism by which the copying of
brand-name drugs’ designs and labeling is not initiated or encouraged
by the brand-name manufacturer, but it is nevertheless systematic,
predictable, and subject to significant control by the brand-name
manufacturer through the FDA.
The prescription drug scenario is therefore unlike situations in
which one manufacturer unilaterally decides to imitate another
manufacturer’s design and no other link connects the two companies.
254
For example, in Piscitello v. Hobart Corp., a federal district court in
Massachusetts faced a situation in which the plaintiff injured her hand
in a meat grinder and sued both the manufacturer of the machine and
255
another company whose design the manufacturer had copied. The
judge rejected the claims against the company that developed the
design but otherwise had no connection to the product or its
manufacture, saying that “[i]t would be unfair to impose such an
expansive view of tort liability on those whose original design is
256
mimicked without the designer’s permission.” Meat grinders, like
most products, are not subject to anything like the FDA’s regulatory
scheme, which systematizes the copying of brand-name drugs and
their labeling and gives brand-name manufacturers the ability to
foresee and control the actions of their generic imitators.

252. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
254. Piscitello v. Hobart Corp., 799 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1992).
255. Id. at 224–25.
256. Id. at 226. The court also noted that there was nothing particularly distinctive about the
design in question, given that it had been utilized for most grinders over the years. Id. at 225.
Indeed, the design could not be validly patented because it “did not require invention to devise
it but only the use of ordinary judgment and mechanical skill.” Id. at 225 n.5 (quoting Hobart
Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 26 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Conn. 1939), aff’d per curiam, 107
F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1939)).
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In arguing on these points, the brand-name manufacturers often
seem to be denying the obvious. They maintain that they have no
257
control over generic drugs or their producers, and they insist that
they cannot reasonably foresee that dangerous flaws in a brand-name
product or its labeling will lead to injuries suffered by those taking the
258
product’s generic equivalents. Many courts, from Foster onward,
259
have accepted those assertions. The brand-name manufacturers’
characterizations of the situation, however, are hard to square with
reality. If a brand-name drug manufacturer is negligent in designing
its product or in preparing labeling or other information disseminated
to doctors, it is highly foreseeable that the risk created will extend to
those taking the generic substitutes as well as those taking the brandname version of the drug. And given that brand-name manufacturers
effectively dictate crucial aspects of the generic products’ designs and
the contents of their labeling, the brand-name manufacturers’
insistence that they have no control over generic drugs is like a person
saying that he has no control over his shadow.
The issue ultimately boils down to how the copying of brandname drugs and labeling that occurs under the auspices of the FDA
and its regulatory scheme should affect the question of liability. Is the
FDA’s regulatory system a reason to absolve the brand-name
manufacturers of liability for generic drug injuries, or a reason to say
that they can be held liable for the foreseeable consequences of their
negligence regardless of whether a particular patient took the brandname or generic version of the drug? That the brand-name
manufacturer does not voluntarily consent to the generic
manufacturer’s imitation of the product points toward a conclusion
that the brand-name manufacturer should not be liable to those
injured by the generic drug. Several other factors point strongly in the

257. See Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 1, 23 (repeatedly disclaiming any
control on Wyeth’s part over the manufacture or sale of the generic drug).
258. See id. at 22 (arguing that a brand-name drug manufacturer cannot reasonably foresee
that its warnings will be relied upon by plaintiffs who ingest the generic version of its products).
259. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that to hold a brand-name manufacturer liable for products of generic manufacturers over
whom it had no control “would be to stretch the concept of foreseeability too far”); Sharp v.
Leichus, No. 2004-CA-0643, 2006 WL 515532, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2006) (“It would be
manifestly unfair to hold a name brand manufacturer responsible for injuries that arise from a
product that is beyond its control.”), aff’d per curiam, 952 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 34 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] manufacturer cannot
reasonably expect that consumers will rely on the information it provides when actually
ingesting another company’s drug.”).
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other direction: the brand-name manufacturers can readily foresee
generic imitation of their products, can easily identify exactly who is
producing the generic versions, and, through the FDA, can force
every generic manufacturer to go along with any change to the
product or its labeling that safety demands.
Plausible arguments can be made in either direction. Resolution
of the issue should not be based on erroneous and overbroad
generalizations—accepted too often by courts in the past—about
manufacturers being liable only for the manufacture and sale of their
own products. Instead, the issue warrants a more cautious
examination of the real consequences and policy concerns at stake.
E. The Impact of Brand-Name Manufacturers’ Liability for Generic
Drug Injuries
Given that the general principles and rules of tort law do not
provide a decisive answer, the issue turns on equity and policy
considerations. Although drug makers have labored mightily to
portray themselves as having the high ground in these respects, their
contentions wilt under closer scrutiny.
Critics of the Conte decision insist that the unfairness of holding
anyone liable for someone else’s product is particularly acute in the
context of brand-name and generic prescription drugs. Brand-name
manufacturers, they argue, lay out the enormous investment in
research and testing necessary to develop a new drug and to steer it
260
through the long and unpredictable FDA approval process. They
then bear the heavy costs of promotional efforts to popularize a drug,
such as running advertisements and sending out sales representatives
261
to inform doctors about the drug. The generic manufacturers then
sweep into the market after the brand-name drug’s patent protection
has expired and reap profits from selling the drug without having
262
incurred any of the costs of its development and promotion. The
brand-name manufacturers believe that these circumstances make it
“totally unfair and draconian” for them to be held responsible for

260. See, e.g., Reply to Answer to Petition for Review at 17–20, Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., No.
S169116 (Cal. Jan. 21, 2009) (describing the “considerable resources” invested in new drugs and
the low odds of obtaining FDA approval).
261. For a description of brand-name manufacturers’ promotional efforts, see supra notes
30–34 and accompanying text.
262. See Reply to Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 260, at 15–16 (noting how
“generic manufacturers benefit from the innovators’ investment of resources”).
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injuries suffered through use of the generic drugs. Indeed, the
lawyers who represent drug companies have tried to come up with a
catchy name for the theory of liability asserted against brand-name
manufacturers by patients who took generic drugs, dubbing it
“pioneer liability” or “innovator liability” to underscore the notion
that it would punish those who do the valuable and difficult work of
264
introducing new drugs.
These arguments rely on a subtle tactic that distracts courts’
attention from the real issue presented. Whenever the brand-name
manufacturers cite fairness concerns, they compare themselves only
265
to the generic drug makers. They emphasize reasons why a brandname manufacturer may deserve liability less than the generic drug
producers who ride on its coattails. By presenting the fairness
question as a choice between blaming the generic drug maker or the
brand-name manufacturer, they omit the plaintiff from the calculus.
They convince courts that the equities of the situation favor the
brand-name manufacturer over the generic producer, never
addressing the possibility that the innocent plaintiff’s needs should
trump those of both manufacturers in any truly comprehensive
assessment of what is fair and just in these circumstances.
Holding a defendant liable for negligence that was a significant
cause of a plaintiff’s injury is not unfair. If the plaintiff took a generic
drug, the brand-name manufacturer will not be subject to strict

263. Respondent Wyeth’s Brief, supra note 145, at 23.
264. See, e.g., Beck & Herrmann, supra note 192 (asserting that the Conte decision “created
a huge ‘free rider’ problem in that pioneer manufacturers are stuck with liability for generic
products that . . . they do not get any profit from”); California Becomes First State to Recognize
Innovator Liability, MAYER BROWN (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/
article.asp?id=6060&nid=6 (“[I]nnovator liability is currently being considered by courts in a
number of additional jurisdictions. In light of the appellate court decision in Conte, courts may
now revisit the reasoning of prior, well-established holdings.”).
265. See, e.g., Reply to Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 260, at 16 (“[T]he Court
of Appeal’s holding is fundamentally unfair and contrary to the public interest. It saddles an
innovator with a duty to all those who use its competitors’ generic products and concomitantly
immunizes the generic manufacturers from liability to users of their own products. In so doing,
it unfairly inflates the costs of the name-brand manufacturer and unfairly minimizes the costs of
its generic manufacturer competitors by shifting costs from the latter to the former.”); Brief of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 92, at 25–26 (“When a prescription is written so as to
allow generic substitution; the pharmacist dispenses a generic product as permitted; the generic
manufacturer profits from the sale of its product; and the product ultimately causes harm, there
is no reason or justification for the brand name manufacturer, whose product was not prescribed
exclusively, was not sold, was not used, and did not cause harm, and who did not profit from a
sale—indeed, lost a sale to a generic competitor—to incur liability for harm caused by its
competitor’s product.”).
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liability; it will be liable only if it failed to use reasonable care in some
vital aspect of developing and testing the drug or in crafting the drug’s
266
warnings, instructions, or promotional statements. Simply requiring
the manufacturer to act with the care of a reasonable person should
not be too much to demand. As the plaintiff in Conte rightly asked,
“[W]hat is unfair about requiring a defendant to shoulder its share of
responsibility for injuries shown to have been caused, at least in part,
by its dissemination of false information, which it reasonably should
267
expect to be relied on by its intended recipients?” Between the
brand-name manufacturer and the generic drug manufacturer,
fairness might favor the former. But between a brand-name
manufacturer that acted negligently and the innocent plaintiff who
suffered serious harm as a result, the fairness inquiry easily tilts in
favor of the latter. In the Foster case, for example, the brand-name
manufacturer allegedly knew that the product and its generic
imitations posed a potentially fatal danger to children, but failed to
268
give adequate warnings that would have saved lives but hurt sales.
The FDA eventually confirmed that the drug needed a much stronger
warning, but that was too late for Brandy Foster and the other
269
children already dead as a result of the manufacturer’s actions.
Likewise, in the Conte case, the brand-name manufacturer allegedly
knew about but downplayed the drug’s risks, causing Elizabeth Conte
and many others to develop a severe and potentially life-threatening
270
neurological disorder. Again, the FDA eventually confirmed that
271
the product’s warnings were dangerously flawed. The plaintiffs in
this category of cases deserve the opportunity to prove that their
allegations are true. And if they succeed, holding the brand-name
drug makers responsible for the harm resulting from their negligence
is far from unfair.
The injustice of giving brand-name manufacturers immunity
from liability for generic drug injuries is particularly severe to the
extent that it would mean no drug maker would have any legal
responsibility for a plaintiff’s injuries. Courts rejecting claims brought
against brand-name manufacturers by patients who took generic

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra Part III.A.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 33, at 18.
See supra notes 80–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145–57, 168–77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
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drugs often seem to assume plaintiffs will still have adequate
272
remedies because the generic drug manufacturers will be liable.
This assumption, however, glosses over the arguments made by
generic drug manufacturers in these cases and the real possibility that
a plaintiff who took a generic drug could be left with no viable claim
against any manufacturer, even for harm caused by an egregiously
flawed product or a grossly inadequate warning.
Indeed, the generic drug makers believe they should never face
any liability because federal law should preempt all state-law tort
273
claims against them. The Supreme Court will soon make an
274
important ruling on the preemption issue, but even if the Court
rules against preemption, the generic drug manufacturers have a
number of other cards to play in many instances. In particular, they
contend that they should never be liable for providing inadequate or
misleading statements in drug labeling if the plaintiff’s doctor never
actually looked at the generic drug’s labeling and instead saw only the
275
information disseminated by the brand-name manufacturer. In
other words, when a doctor gets information about a drug from the
brand-name manufacturer, but the patient receives the generic drug,
both the brand-name and generic manufacturers will insist that they
can have no liability. The brand-name manufacturer will say the
plaintiff did not take its product, and the generic drug maker will say
the plaintiff’s doctor did not rely on its warnings or representations
about the product. According to the drug companies, both
manufacturers should escape liability in those circumstances, even if
both were negligent and their wrongdoing combined to cause
catastrophic harm to the plaintiff.
Likewise, in the opposite situation, when a plaintiff’s doctor saw
the flawed warnings and misleading representations about the drug
only in the generic product’s labeling, but the plaintiff took the brandname drug, both manufacturers again would insist that neither can be
held liable. This situation would occur very rarely, if ever, because
doctors typically do not learn about a drug from the generic product’s
272. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We do not
accept the assertion that a generic manufacturer is not responsible for negligent
misrepresentations on its product labels if it did not initially formulate the warnings and
representations itself.”); supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
275. Conte v. Wyeth, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 318–19 (Ct. App. 2008); see supra notes 185–87
and accompanying text.

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

1179

276

Instead, doctors are much more likely to receive
labeling.
information generated by the brand-name manufacturer, whether
through the brand-name product’s labeling, the Physicians’ Desk
Reference, or sales representatives or advertisements touting the
brand-name drug. But to the extent that it ever happened, the
manufacturers’ responses to the dilemma would be just as unfair as in
the more common scenario in which the doctor relied on information
about the brand-name drug but the patient received the generic
equivalent. Either way, the doctor saw one company’s labeling, but
the plaintiff received another company’s product. According to the
manufacturers, the injured patient thus has no claim against either.
Table 1 illustrates the possibilities. The drug companies’
arguments would preclude liability for inadequate warnings or
misrepresentations in every instance in which the doctor’s source of
information did not match the pharmacist’s source of the drug itself.
No manufacturer would be liable in situations like Foster and Conte,
represented by the upper-right quadrant of the diagram, or in the
much less common but equally problematic scenario represented by
the lower-left quadrant.
Table 1. Implications of the Drug Companies’ Arguments about
Inadequate Warning and Misrepresentation Claims
The patient takes the drug made by . . .

The doctor
relies on
information
from . . .

Brand-name manufacturer

Generic manufacturer

Brand-name
manufacturer

Brand-name manufacturer
can be liable

No manufacturer
can be liable

Generic
manufacturer

No manufacturer
can be liable

Generic manufacturer
can be liable

When the brand-name manufacturer negligently made
dangerous missteps in preparing its warnings and other
representations about its product, and when the generic manufacturer
carelessly repeated those statements verbatim on its labeling, what

276. I suspect that there may never be a situation in which a doctor prescribes a drug based
solely on information generated by the generic drug manufacturer. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum
Concerning Pertinent Aspects of the Rostron Article, supra note 202, at 8 (“The likelihood of
any doctor’s even possessing a generic prescription drug’s label, much less reading or relying on
it, in the ordinary course of his or her practice, is so remote as to border on the nonexistent.”).
But I nevertheless address that scenario, because it is impossible to be certain or to prove that it
never happens, and because I think it is helpful to consider every possible permutation in
developing theories about the handling of these situations.
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legitimate basis could exist in principle, policy, or fairness for
absolving both manufacturers of liability because of a fortuitous
mismatch between which version of the drug’s labeling the doctor
happened to remember seeing and which version of the drug the
pharmacist happened to dispense? The drug manufacturers never
squarely answer that question. Instead, one manufacturer will simply
argue that “it wasn’t my drug,” and the other will separately contend
that “it wasn’t my label.” And they will hope that the court lets each
avoid liability. Indeed, when pressed at an oral argument by a judge
who wanted to know why a plaintiff injured because of inadequate
warnings should be left with no recourse because her pharmacist
dispensed the generic version of a drug, the defendants suggested that
“consumers who opt for generic drugs over name-brand equivalents
may have effectively lost their right to recompense for injuries
277
suffered from inadequate warnings in the bargain.” In other words,
if the plaintiff saved a little money by taking the generic version of a
drug, the plaintiff should not be heard to complain no matter how
harmful the drug turns out to be or how careless its manufacturers
turn out to have been.
This argument overlooks the fact that many consumers have
little choice about whether to receive generic drugs because health
insurance plans or government programs like Medicaid may refuse to
278
cover brand-name drugs once generic substitutes become available.
Even when consumers do willingly pick generic drugs to save money,
they do not thereby waive their right to hold negligent parties liable.
Imagine, for example, facing the parents of an infant child who died
as a result of taking cough syrup, and telling them that the brandname manufacturer that wrote the product’s inadequate warnings will
not be held responsible for negligently putting profits ahead of safety,
but that, on the other hand, they should look on the bright side
because they probably saved a few dollars when the pharmacist gave

277. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279, 308 n.40 (D.N.H. 2009). The judge in
Bartlett posed this question in the context of deciding whether federal law preempts inadequate
warning claims against generic drug manufacturers. The judge concluded that Congress could
not have intended to leave consumers of generic drugs without a remedy against a manufacturer
for harm suffered because a drug’s labeling provided inadequate warnings. Id. at 308–09.
278. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., No. 05 C 1490, 2005 WL 1323435, at *15 (N.D.
Ill. June 3, 2005) (explaining that once a generic version of a brand-name drug becomes
available, the managed-care provider will pay more toward the generic version than toward the
branded product), vacated on other grounds, 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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them a generic version of the cough syrup. That notion “is not only
280
distasteful but also contrary to fundamental principles of tort law.”
Brand-name manufacturers stand on firmer ground, however,
when they insist that generic drug makers should not be given unfair
281
advantages over them. For example, the California Court of Appeal
concluded in Conte that although the plaintiff could proceed to trial
on her negligent misrepresentation claim against the brand-name
drug manufacturer, the generic manufacturers could not be held
liable because Conte’s doctor did not look at the generic product
labeling or otherwise rely on any generic manufacturer’s
282
representations about the product.
By letting the generic
manufacturers avoid responsibility for Conte’s injuries, the court
created an unfair imbalance between the treatment of the brandname and generic drug producers. Under the Conte approach, if a
drug lacks adequate warnings, its brand-name manufacturer may
wind up being liable for harm to those who took either the brandname or the generic version of the drug, whereas the generic
manufacturers likely will wind up not being liable to anyone. That
asymmetry is particularly unfair given that the brand-name
manufacturers make substantial investments in developing new drugs
from which generic producers profit by copying. In the pithy words of
one blog reader reacting to discussion of the Conte decision, “I should
283
get in on this generic med business—tons of money and no risk.”
Although fairness considerations should tip the balance on these
issues toward innocent plaintiffs and against manufacturers, they do
not justify such an odd misallocation of the responsibility between the
brand-name manufacturer and its generic imitators.
The unfairness of this imbalance is exacerbated by the inherent
difficulty of determining why a doctor prescribed a certain drug for a
particular patient. Researchers have found, for example, that doctors
often do not recognize or do not accurately report the factors that
279. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
280. Bartlett, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 308 n.40.
281. See, e.g., Reply to Answer to Petition for Review, supra note 260, at 16 (complaining
that the Conte decision “saddles an innovator with a duty to all those who use its competitors’
generic products and concomitantly immunizes the generic manufacturers from liability to users
of their own products,” thereby “unfairly inflat[ing] the costs of the name-brand manufacturer
and unfairly minimiz[ing] the costs of its generic manufacturer competitors”).
282. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
283. Ed Silverman, Brand-Name Makers Liable for Generic Injuries, PHARMALOT (Nov. 8,
2008, 8:34 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/11/brand-name-makers-liable-forgeneric-injuries (comment posted by “G” on Nov. 8, 2008, 4:56 PM).
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actually drove their therapeutic decisionmaking about use of
284
prescription drugs. When asked why they chose a drug, doctors
exaggerate the extent to which they rely on scientific sources, such as
reports in medical journals, while understating the influence of
commercial channels of information such as a drug company’s
285
advertisements and sales representatives. Doctors’ self-assessments
therefore seem to be unreliable indicators of what really drives
286
prescribing behavior.
Cases like Foster and Conte illustrate the perils of putting too
much weight on what doctors say about their reasons for prescribing a
drug. In each case, the doctor’s deposition testimony about his
287
prescription decisionmaking was equivocal and ambiguous.
Compounding that difficulty, the drug manufacturers in each case
procured declarations from the doctors that muddied the matter even
288
further. The reality is that doctors typically learn about drugs from
289
an array of sources, and it is generally unrealistic to expect them to
be able to pinpoint exactly which sources or pieces of information
they relied upon in prescribing a drug for a particular patient. This
problem is not a reason to give drug manufacturers immunity from
liability, but rather it demonstrates why courts should strive to handle
these sorts of cases in ways that treat plaintiffs and defendants fairly
without putting undue weight on doctors’ unreliable self-reporting.
Although important concerns about fairness and sound public
policy exist on all sides of the issue, manufacturers ultimately should
be held responsible when their negligence causes severe harm to
others. In cases like Foster, courts have gone too far in categorically
exempting brand-name drug manufacturers from liability to those
injured by use of generic drugs. In drawing the boundaries of liability,
however, courts should take into account the potential for unfairly
creating an imbalance in the liability exposure of brand-name and
generic drug producers, as well as the difficulties of determining the
particular sources of information on which a doctor relied in

284. See Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific Versus Commercial Sources
of Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4, 4 (1982) (“This limits
the value of self-report as a means of determining how physicians make prescribing decisions.”).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 7.
287. See supra notes 98–103, 160–65 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 104–08, 166–67 and accompanying text.
289. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 91, at 24.
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prescribing a drug for a patient. Part IV proposes a scheme of liability
that takes account of these myriad concerns.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO LIABILITY OF BRAND-NAME AND
GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS
Weighing the significant considerations at stake when a plaintiff
asserts tort claims based on a harmful flaw in the design or labeling of
290
the brand-name and generic versions of a drug, the liability
framework described here seeks to achieve a fair balance of the
interests of injured plaintiffs, brand-name manufacturers, and their
generic counterparts.
A. Design-Defect Claims
In cases in which a patient took a brand-name drug and claims to
have suffered harm because of a defect in the product’s design, the
analysis will be relatively simple. The brand-name manufacturer may
be liable because it designed, manufactured, and sold the item that
caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. The precise contours of that
liability vary from state to state and continue to be the subject of
291
intense controversy. In particular, courts disagree about the extent
to which strict liability should be available for a design-defect claim
292
when the product is a prescription drug. But under whatever
approach the relevant state uses, a brand-name manufacturer might

290. Manufacturing defect claims do not raise the sorts of problems discussed in this Article.
Unlike a flaw in a drug’s design or labeling, a manufacturing defect typically will be a problem
unique to one manufacturer. For example, if a mistake on a generic drug manufacturer’s
production line causes some units of the product to be tainted with impurities or to contain the
wrong amount of a crucial ingredient, there would be no sound reason to hold the brand-name
manufacturer responsible, barring some sort of unusual scenario in which the brand-name
manufacturer was somehow involved in setting up or running the generic manufacturer’s
operations. Likewise, no reason would exist for holding generic drug makers responsible for
errors occurring in production of the brand-name drug.
291. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–79 (“Many have been bewitched, bedazzled,
and bewildered in attempting to figure just how principles of design defectiveness should be
applied to prescription drugs . . . .”); Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and
Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical
Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 707 (1990) (“Unfortunately, the courts seem unable to agree on a
consistent set of liability rules to apply in drug injury cases.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note
15, at 162–81 (responding to criticisms of the Third Restatement’s approach to design-defect
claims against prescription drug manufacturers); Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability
Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 842–48 (2009) (explaining the different
approaches courts use in resolving design-defect claims for prescription drugs).
292. OWEN, supra note 60, § 8.10, at 566–79.
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be liable when the plaintiff took the brand-name drug. Generic
manufacturers, on the other hand, should not be liable for a design
flaw in a brand-name product. They neither manufactured that
product nor played a role in determining its design.
The situation is more complicated when the plaintiff instead took
a generic version of the drug. In that scenario, the brand-name
manufacturer and generic manufacturer share responsibility for the
design of the product that the plaintiff received, because the brandname manufacturer initially developed the drug, and the generic
manufacturer copied key aspects of that original design to produce a
product close enough in its material characteristics to earn FDA
approval as a generic equivalent. Both the brand-name manufacturer
and the generic manufacturer thus have a sufficient connection to the
product’s design to justify imposing liability on both for harm
resulting from a dangerous flaw in the design.
The brand-name manufacturers will vigorously contest this
conclusion on the ground that they should not be liable for a design
defect in someone else’s product. Moreover, the approach that I
suggest creates some asymmetry, with brand-name manufacturers
bearing some risk of liability for design flaws in generic products, but
generic manufacturers facing no risk of liability for design defects in
brand-name drugs.
Two considerations, however, could soften the effect on brandname manufacturers. One is that a plaintiff who took a generic drug
will be able to prevail on a design-defect claim against the brandname manufacturer only by proving negligence. In other words, strict
liability cannot be imposed, and the brand-name manufacturer will be
able to avoid liability simply by exercising reasonable care in
developing the product. This would be consistent with the general
view in products liability that nonmanufacturing designers can be
293
held liable for negligence but are not subject to strict liability.
In addition, it would be appropriate for courts in these
circumstances, in which a plaintiff who took the generic drug prevails
on a design-defect claim, to assign primary liability to the generic
manufacturer and to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable only in
a secondary capacity. If the generic manufacturer is capable of paying
the judgment (or whatever share of the judgment is assigned to that
manufacturer under comparative fault or similar principles), it should

293. See supra notes 74–75, 243 and accompanying text.
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be required to do so. The brand-name manufacturer would become
obligated to pay only in the event that the generic manufacturer was
defunct, bankrupt, or otherwise unable to compensate the plaintiff.
Tort law utilizes this sort of primary-secondary liability structure
in other contexts. The most prominent example is the doctrine of
respondeat superior, under which an employer can be held liable for a
294
tort committed by its employee within the scope of the employment.
The employee has primary liability, while the employer’s liability is
only secondary in nature, and therefore the employer is entitled to
demand full indemnification from the employee for any amount it
295
pays the plaintiff. Products liability law provides another example.
Although courts can impose strict tort liability on wholesale and retail
sellers of a defective product, the liability of these nonmanufacturing
296
sellers is secondary to that of the manufacturer. If unaware of the
defect, the wholesale or retail seller may be liable to a plaintiff, but
297
then will be entitled to full indemnification by the manufacturer. In
each of these situations, the defendant with secondary liability
essentially bears the burden of compensating the plaintiff only if the
primarily liable defendant cannot do so.
This sort of primary-secondary liability approach would be
appropriate for design-defect claims brought by plaintiffs who took
generic drugs, but not because brand-name manufacturers should be
forced to serve as insurers or guarantors for the liabilities of the
generic drug producers. Likewise, the idea is not that brand-name
manufacturers should be subjected to unwarranted liability merely
because they may have deeper pockets than many generic drug
producers. Liability instead should be structured in this manner
because sufficient grounds exist for imposing liability on both the
294. See DOBBS, supra note 214, § 333, at 905 (explaining the vicarious liability theory of
respondeat superior).
295. Id. § 333, at 906.
296. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2) (1979) (“[I]ndemnity is
granted [when t]he indemnitor supplied a defective chattel . . . as a result of which both
[tortfeasors] were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed
to discover the defect . . . .”).
297. Id. For a thorough discussion of the issue, see Dragan M. Ćetković, Loss Shifting:
Upstream Common Law Indemnity in Products Liability, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 75, 79 (1994). Some
states have gone further and enacted “innocent seller” statutes giving retailers and other
nonmanufacturing sellers even greater protection from liability than that afforded by the
common law doctrine of indemnification. Id.; see also OWEN, supra note 60, § 15.2, at 1010–11
& nn.81–90 (explaining that some states, in response to fairness concerns, have enacted statutes
to shield retailers from liability and “in at least a couple instances statutory provisions exempt
non-manufacturers unconditionally from strict products liability in tort”).
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brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer, but the
former’s link to the product is not as direct as that of the latter. Put
another way, between the brand-name manufacturer who acted
negligently and the innocent plaintiff who suffered serious harm as a
result, the law should come down on the side of the plaintiff. But
between the brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer,
the balance tips in favor of imposing liability primarily on the latter
because it manufactured and profited from the sale of the particular
item that directly inflicted the plaintiff’s injuries.
B. Inadequate Warning and Misrepresentation Claims
Inadequate warnings and misrepresentations pose difficult issues
as well, and they have been the focus of Foster, Conte, and most of
the other relevant cases in this area. Although the line between an
inadequate warning claim and a misrepresentation claim is sometimes
indistinct, the former essentially involves omission of important
information about the product’s risks, whereas the latter typically
298
involves a false statement about the product. These types of claims
thus relate not only to the product itself but also to the information
provided about the product. That duality underlies the dilemma
posed by these claims in cases about brand-name and generic drugs. If
one manufacturer supplied the product itself, but another supplied
information about the product, who should be responsible for harm
that results if the product causes injury because the information was
inadequate, misleading, or erroneous?
The drug manufacturers’ arguments ultimately would lead to the
conclusion that a defendant can be held liable only if it supplied both
the drug that the plaintiff received and the faulty information on
299
which the plaintiff’s doctor relied. When there was a mismatch
between the source of the drug and the source of information, neither
manufacturer could be held accountable. In some instances, the
plaintiff might have viable claims against other parties, such as a
medical malpractice claim against a doctor, but many plaintiffs would
simply be unable to recover any compensation. The brand-name and
generic manufacturers would avoid liability even if they each acted in
appallingly negligent ways and unmistakably caused the plaintiff to
298. See OWEN, supra note 60, § 3.2, at 117–23 (discussing whether a defendant’s failure to
disclose information about a product can support a misrepresentation claim or only a failure-towarn claim).
299. See supra Table 1, notes 272–80, and accompanying text.
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suffer very severe harm. Rather than permit this unjust result, courts
should recognize that a drug manufacturer can be held liable even if it
did not supply both the product and the faulty information that
caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
Reaching that conclusion, however, leaves unanswered some
difficult questions about exactly what the scope of manufacturers’
liability should be in various situations. Table 2 lays out, once again,
each of the four basic scenarios that may arise.
Table 2. A Proposed Approach to Inadequate Warning and
Misrepresentation Claims
The patient takes the drug made by . . .

The doctor
relies on
information
from . . .

Brand-name
manufacturer

Generic manufacturer

Brand-name
manufacturer

Brand-name
manufacturer
can be liable

Generic manufacturer can
be liable (with brand-name
manufacturer only
secondarily liable)

Generic
manufacturer

Brand-name
manufacturer can be
liable (with generic
manufacturer only
secondarily liable)

Generic manufacturer can
be liable

In each situation, one could argue that all manufacturers of the
drug should be liable because, in some sense, the conduct of every
manufacturer was an actual cause of the plaintiff’s harm. For
example, if a patient took the brand-name drug and her doctor
looked only at the brand-name product’s labeling, one could argue
that the generic manufacturers nevertheless caused the plaintiff’s
injuries by failing to speak up about the product’s risks. If a generic
manufacturer had told the FDA that the information in the product’s
labeling was inadequate or misleading, the FDA could have required
every producer of the drug, including the brand-name manufacturer,
to change the labeling. Such a change could have saved the plaintiff
from suffering harm. Likewise, if a patient took a generic version of
the drug and her doctor relied upon information solely from the
generic product’s labeling, the plaintiff could still blame the brandname manufacturer for drafting the flawed content of the original
labeling that the generic manufacturer copied. If the brand-name
manufacturer had written adequate labeling in the first place, or later
asked the FDA for necessary changes to ensure safe use of the drug,
the plaintiff would not have been injured.
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Though perhaps liability could theoretically be imposed on every
manufacturer of the drug even in situations in which one
manufacturer actually provided both the drug and the information on
which the patient’s doctor relied, as a practical matter this solution
would stretch the net of liability too far. Although all of the drug’s
manufacturers may have acted negligently, and although each one’s
conduct technically would have been an actual cause of the plaintiff’s
harm, the link between a manufacturer and the injury becomes
weaker and more indirect if the manufacturer neither produced the
drug that the plaintiff received nor generated the information that the
plaintiff’s doctor saw. At some point, the interests weighing in the
plaintiff’s favor can no longer justify the sheer logistical difficulties
presented by the proliferation of potential liability. For example,
imagine a situation in which a patient took a drug manufactured by
Company X, based entirely on information supplied by Company X,
but dozens or even hundreds of other companies made the same drug,
and thus could have acted to strengthen the warnings and prevent the
300
harm. Would it really be worth the additional complexity of making
all of those companies, in addition to Company X, potentially liable
for the injury? Moreover, allowing all manufacturers of the drug to be
held liable would open the door to very difficult questions about
allocating liability among them. That thorny nest of issues can be
avoided by drawing a simple and common-sense line that limits
liability to the one manufacturer that produced both the drug that the
plaintiff received and the information that the plaintiff’s doctor saw.
301
Lines must be drawn somewhere.
This still leaves the more difficult dilemma of what to do in
situations in which one manufacturer made the drug but another
generated the labeling or other information on which the doctor
relied in prescribing the drug. In these situations, with only two
manufacturers involved, each having a distinct and significant
connection to the plaintiff’s injury, no extreme practical difficulties or
complexities weigh against imposing liability on both manufacturers.
The most common scenario, addressed in cases like Foster and Conte
and illustrated in the upper right quadrant of Table 2, occurs when
300. That a drug could be produced by hundreds of different manufacturers is not merely a
hypothetical possibility. See Rostron, supra note 227, at 159 (describing how hundreds of
pharmaceutical companies produced the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES)).
301. In the immortal words of Judge William Andrews, “We draw an uncertain and
wavering line, but draw it we must as best we can.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E.
99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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the patient took the generic drug but the doctor relied exclusively on
information from the drug’s brand-name producer. The opposite
situation, represented by the lower left quadrant of Table 2, could
also happen, with the patient taking the brand-name drug but the
patient’s doctor relying on information from a generic manufacturer,
302
although that is likely to be a very rare occurrence.
In these situations, in which one manufacturer supplied the drug
and the other provided the faulty information about the drug, both
manufacturers should be potentially liable. Each has a direct and
substantial link to the plaintiff’s use of the drug and resulting harm.
Regardless of whether the plaintiff received the brand-name or
generic version of the drug, the brand-name manufacturer could have
prevented the plaintiff’s injuries by acting carefully and by providing
adequate and accurate information about its product. Likewise,
regardless of whether the plaintiff took the brand-name or generic
drug, the generic manufacturer could have prevented the harm by
pointing out the flaws in the information being disseminated about
the product and by asking the FDA to take corrective action. When
each manufacturer has such a strong causal connection to the
plaintiff’s injuries, both should potentially be liable.
The liability of the two manufacturers in these situations could
have the same primary-secondary structure suggested for design303
defect claims. Whichever manufacturer actually made the drug that
a plaintiff received should be primarily liable; the other manufacturer,
which generated the information on which the plaintiff’s doctor
relied, should be obligated to pay damages only if the primarily liable
manufacturer turns out to be insolvent or otherwise unable to pay.
This would alleviate at least some of the unfairness that brand-name
manufacturers see in being held liable when generic manufacturers
profited by copying the brand-name product and riding the coattails
of the brand-name manufacturers’ research efforts and discoveries. If
generic manufacturers capture most of the market for the drug, they
will wind up bearing the bulk of the liability to those successfully
asserting inadequate-warning or misrepresentation claims.
This approach to liability of brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers also would have the salutary effect of diminishing the
significance of evidentiary disputes about what information a
particular doctor had in mind when prescribing a drug for a certain
302. See supra notes 36–37, 276 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part IV.A.

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

1190

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1123

patient. As past cases like Foster and Conte illustrate, that is often an
extremely muddled factual question to which no clear answer will
304
exist. The approach proposed here reduces the chances that a
plaintiff’s entire case will hinge on difficult determinations about a
doctor’s hazy and conflicting recollections. For example, when the
plaintiff took the generic drug, the generic drug maker will be the
manufacturer with primary liability for inadequate warnings or
misrepresentations. If the generic manufacturer can pay the damages
awarded, trying to prove that the brand-name manufacturer is
secondarily liable because the plaintiff’s doctor relied on its
information will be a moot point. When the generic manufacturer
cannot pay, the brand-name manufacturer’s potential secondary
liability will become relevant and therefore the question of what
information the doctor considered may become crucial. The approach
proposed here, however, will reduce to some extent the odds that a
plaintiff’s entire recovery turns on nebulous factual determinations
about what influenced a doctor’s decision to write a prescription.
CONCLUSION
The California Court of Appeal defied an imposing body of
precedent when it ruled in Conte that a brand-name drug
manufacturer could be liable for harm suffered by a person who took
a generic product made by another company. Although widely
scorned as a misguided and aberrational departure from sound policy
and tort principles, Conte in fact represents the most careful and
sophisticated consideration that any court has given to these difficult
issues. Rather than brush aside the plaintiff’s arguments with
conclusory assumptions and crude overgeneralizations, the California
court followed basic tort principles and methodically reviewed the
elements of the claims asserted and the crucial competing interests
underlying the case. Whether one agrees with its conclusions, the
California court deserves credit for giving these issues the fresh look
that they deserved.
Though I ultimately come out on the plaintiffs’ side of the key
questions analyzed here, no one should doubt that imposing liability
on drug manufacturers is a serious matter that deserves courts’ most
cautious and thorough analysis. Drug companies engage in a business
of critical importance, developing products of enormous potential

304. See supra notes 98–108, 160–67 and accompanying text.

ROSTRON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

1/14/2011 1:00:36 PM

TORT LAW AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

1191

benefit to humanity. Tort law could go too far in discouraging the
development of innovative new drugs. The application of legal rules
could be skewed too much against defendants in drug cases, with
judges and juries demanding perfection that cannot be attained and
seeing negligence that does not really exist. Overwarning about every
imaginable risk may drive doctors and patients to overlook truly
significant precautionary information, deter doctors from prescribing
worthwhile drugs, or scare patients out of taking drugs that would
benefit them. These risks are real.
At the same time, drug companies also have been responsible for
some of the world’s most notorious product catastrophes, such as
305
DES, the Dalkon Shield, and thalidomide. The FDA’s regulatory
oversight repeatedly has proven insufficient to prevent unreasonably
306
dangerous drugs from reaching consumers. Tort law provides vital
incentives for drug makers to act with appropriate care. Courts
should apply tort law in a manner that encourages drug companies to
continue producing innovative products but also to act reasonably to
ensure that their products are safe and accompanied by adequate
warnings and accurate information. Striking the right balance is a
challenge, but it is one that courts must continue striving to meet.
These issues can quite literally be matters of life and death.

305. See generally CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, THE BITTEREST PILL: HOW DRUG
COMPANIES FAIL TO PROTECT WOMEN AND HOW LAWSUITS SAVE THEIR LIVES (2008)
(discussing the serious injuries and deaths caused by DES, the Dalkon Shield, thalidomide, and
other products).
306. See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED. OF
THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 17 (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Sheila P. Burke eds., 2007)
(“FDA’s performance in approving drugs or monitoring their safety after approval has been
questioned and criticized.”). For a discussion of how political influence has damaged the FDA’s
scientific integrity, see generally James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second
Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
939 (2008).

